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Response to Sex Offender Treatment Program Must Be “Exceptional” to Warrant Downward Departure (SORA)

The Second Department noted that defendant did not present sufficient support for a downward departure based upon his participation in a sex offender treatment program because the defendant did not establish his response to treatment was “exceptional.” People v Tisman, 2014 NY Slip Op 02913, 2nd Detp 4-30-14

 

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