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SCHOOL-GROUNDS RESTRICTION APPLIES ONLY TO OFFENDERS SERVING A SENTENCE FOR ONE OF THE OFFENSES ENUMERATED IN THE EXECUTIVE LAW AT THE TIME OF RELEASE, SINCE PETITIONER, WHO WAS A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER, WAS SERVING A SENTENCE FOR BURGLARY AT THE TIME OF RELEASE, THE SCHOOL-GROUNDS RESTRICTION DID NOT APPLY TO HIM (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Aarons, disagreeing with the 4th Department, determined that the restriction in the Executive Law prohibiting a sex offender from living within 1000 feet of a school only applied if the sentence being served at the time of release on parole is for one of the offenses enumerated in the statute. Defendant had previously been convicted of a sex offense and had been adjudicated a level three sex offender. But the offense for which he was incarcerated at the time of his release (burglary) is not an enumerated offense:

… [T]he statute is unambiguous and interpret it in the manner advanced by him. In this regard, we read “such person” as plainly and unequivocally referring to “a person serving a sentence for an offense defined in [Penal Law articles 130, 135 or 263 or Penal Law § 255.25, § 255.26 or 255.27]” (Executive Law § 259-c [14]). We are unpersuaded by respondent’s contention that “such person” in Executive Law § 259-c (14) can be rationally read to refer only to “a person” or “a person serving a sentence” as stated in the beginning of the statute and without regard to that part of the statute specifying various offenses. Based on the foregoing, we find that the school-grounds restriction provided in Executive Law § 259-c (14) applies either to (1) an offender serving one of the enumerated offenses whose victim was under 18 years old, or (2) an offender serving one of the enumerated offenses who was designated a risk level three sex offender. Because petitioner was not serving a sentence for an offense delineated in Executive Law § 259-c (14), the statute does not apply to him. People v Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility, 2019 NY Slip Op 01267, Third Dept 2-21-19

 

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