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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED UNLOADING A TRUCK, HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured when a truck was being unloaded:

A hydraulic lift was being used to lower the flooring materials in pallets, or “skids,” weighing approximately 2,500 to 3,000 pounds, from the bed of the truck to the ground, an elevation of approximately four feet. One of the skids, which had been loaded onto the lift, fell off the lift and struck the plaintiff. …

” Labor Law § 240(1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person'” … . The plaintiff’s evidence established, prima facie, that the … defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1) by failing to provide an appropriate safety device to secure the subject materials as they were being lowered, and that this failure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury … . Ramos-Perez v Evelyn USA, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 00629, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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