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DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE DEFENDANT THE WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE SHOULD HE GO TO TRIAL, DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS THEREFORE NOT VOLUNTARY, EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT FOR APPEAL APPLIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined: (1) the plea was not voluntary because defendant was given the wrong information about the possible maximum sentence if he went to trial; and (2) the error is an exception to the preservation requirement for appeal because defendant could not have known of the error at the time of the plea:

The Court of Appeals … has carved out an exception to the preservation doctrine “because of the actual or practical unavailability of either a motion to withdraw the plea’ or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction,'” in certain instances, reasoning that ” a defendant can hardly be expected to move to withdraw his plea on a ground of which he has no knowledge'” … . Moreover, the defendant’s contention that his plea of guilty was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent survives his valid appeal waiver … . …

Here, the defendant’s plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The record demonstrates that the defendant was not presented with legitimate alternatives about the maximum sentence he faced in the event he chose to reject the People’s plea offer and was convicted after trial. … On this record, given the difference between the incorrect maximum aggregate sentence of 3 to 5 years that defense counsel communicated to the defendant, the actual maximum aggregate sentence of 2 to 4 years, and the bargained-for sentence of 1½ to 3 years, the threat of a higher sentence rendered the defendant’s plea involuntary … . People v Keller, 2019 NY Slip Op 00620, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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