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PLAINTIFF, WHO IS DEFENDANT’S SON, FELL FROM A LADDER WHEN ATTEMPTING TO INSPECT A DAMAGED CHIMNEY ON DEFENDANT’S RENTAL PROPERTY, QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR A VOLUNTEER, WHETHER THE INSPECTION WAS COVERED BY THE LABOR LAW, AND WHETHER DEFENDANT SUPERVISED PLAINTIFF’S WORK PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6), 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that questions of fact about (1) whether plaintiff was an employee or a volunteer, (2) whether the inspection work came within the scope of Labor Law coverage, and (3) whether defendant supervised plaintiff’s work giving rise to Labor Law 200 or common-law negligence liability. Plaintiff is defendant’s son and lives with defendant. Defendant owns rental property next door. Defendant set up a ladder for plaintiff at the rental property and asked him to inspect the chimney because pieces of it had fallen to the ground. Plaintiff and the ladder fell when he attempted to inspect the chimney. Plaintiff brought Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6), 200 and common-law negligence causes of action:

… [D]efendant’s testimony … established that she directed plaintiff on what to do when he inspected the chimney, had previously paid him for repairs and would have paid him if he had carried out the chimney cap repairs. We agree with Supreme Court that this testimony presents a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was a volunteer or an employee within the meaning of the Labor Law and the Industrial Code … . …

As plaintiff and defendant both anticipated that plaintiff would carry out the repair if his inspection revealed that this would be feasible, this record does not permit a determination as a matter of law that the chimney inspection was “a separate phase easily distinguishable from” the actual repair, and thus outside the statutory protection … .

Although defendant asserts that she did not supervise plaintiff’s work and did not tell him how to use the ladder, her own testimony establishes that the ladder belonged to her and that she put it in place — allegedly on uneven ground — without plaintiff’s participation, directed him to use the ladder, and told him what to do in inspecting the chimney. Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant exercised supervisory control over the manner and methods by which plaintiff performed the task of inspecting the chimney … . Doskotch v Pisocki, 2019 NY Slip Op 00017, Third Dept 1-3-19

 

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