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28 MONTH DELAY DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, DELAY ATTRIBUTED TO PROSECUTION, HOWEVER, WAS CRITICIZED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a concurring decision, determined that the 28-month delay in prosecution did not rise to the level of a denial of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The concurrence agreed but took pains to note that much of the delay attributable to the prosecution was inexcusable:

While the 28—month delay was substantial, it was attributable to both the prosecution and the defense. While most adjournments were either on consent or were otherwise satisfactorily explained, the People failed to provide an adequate reason for their delay in responding to defendant’s motion to compel production of certain medical records and in producing the records. Nevertheless, the charges were very serious and, although defendant was incarcerated the entire time, he has not demonstrated how his defense was impaired by the delay. This is not a case where the delay, and in particular the portion attributable to the People, was so egregious as to warrant dismissal regardless of prejudice … . People v Desselle, 2018 NY Slip Op 08252, First Dept 12-4-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, 28 MONTH DELAY DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, DELAY ATTRIBUTED TO PROSECUTION, HOWEVER, WAS CRITICIZED (FIRST DEPT))/SPEEDY TRIAL (28 MONTH DELAY DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, DELAY ATTRIBUTED TO PROSECUTION, HOWEVER, WAS CRITICIZED (FIRST DEPT))

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