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DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY TO SCALDING A DISABLED CHILD BY BATHING HER IN WATER THAT WAS TOO HOT, AT THE SUBSEQUENT CIVIL TRIAL DEFENDANT WAS ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHILD SUFFERED AN ALLERGIC REACTION AND HAD NOT BEEN SCALDED, THE DEFENSE VERDICT WAS AFFIRMED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE REQUESTING THAT THE GUILTY PLEA BE GIVEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF THE ALLERGIC REACTION WAS ACTUALLY AN UNTIMELY SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, DESPITE SUPREME COURT’S GRANTING OF THE MOTION, THE DEFENSE VERDICT MAKES ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE ERROR UNNECESSARY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department affirmed the defense jury verdict in a case preceded by defendant’s guilty plea to endangering the welfare of an incompetent or physically disabled person. It was alleged that defendant (Tiger), a nurse, scalded a 10-year-old severely disabled child (Alejandra) by bathing the child in hot water. After defendant pled guilty she moved set aside her conviction and submitted evidence the child suffered an allergic reaction which was misinterpreted as skin burns. The Appellate Division granted the motion to set aside the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the “actual innocence” defense is not available after a guilty plea. In the subsequent civil trial, plaintiff had brought a motion in limine requesting that the guilty plea be given collateral estoppel effect and that the defendant be prohibited from presenting evidence of the allergic reaction. Supreme Court essentially granted the motion but allowed cross-examination of the plaintiff’s experts about the allergic reaction. The Second Department determined the motion in limine was actually an untimely motion for summary judgment. But in light of the defense verdict, no further action by the appellate court was necessary:

During the trial in this action, the defendants sought to establish that Alejandra’s injuries were not caused by scalding water, relying upon medical records and cross-examining the plaintiff’s expert witnesses as to whether Alejandra’s injuries were the result of toxic epidermal necrolysis (hereinafter TEN), a type of severe skin reaction, purportedly caused by a drug Alejandra had been prescribed prior to the incident in question. Of note, Alejandra’s skin was biopsied at the hospital one day after the incident, and a pathology report, which the defendants did not discover until very late during the litigation, concluded that the biopsy was, inter alia, consistent with a diagnosis of TEN. Tiger has sought to set aside her conviction based upon, inter alia, the conclusions asserted in the belatedly discovered pathology report … . …

The plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court failed to give the criminal plea proper collateral estoppel effect and that the sole question for the jury should have been the amount of damages. On the eve of trial, the plaintiff sought an in limine ruling, based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel, that Tiger’s criminal plea conclusively established that she was negligent as a matter of law and that her negligence proximately caused Alejandra’s injuries. Further, the plaintiff argued that the defendants should be precluded from introducing any evidence that Alejandra’s injuries were caused by TEN. The court, in effect, granted the plaintiff’s application in part, by submitting only the question of proximate cause to the jury and, thus, in effect, awarding the plaintiff judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Tiger’s negligence. The court further ruled that the defendants were precluded from introducing evidence regarding TEN in their case-in-chief, but permitted them to cross-examine the plaintiff’s experts regarding the medical records concluding that Alejandra’s injuries were caused by TEN.

We agree with the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff’s pretrial application, characterized as one for in limine relief, was the functional equivalent of an untimely motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability … . “[A] motion in limine is an inappropriate substitute for a motion for summary judgment” … . Further, “in the absence of any showing of good cause’ for the late filing of such a motion (CPLR 3212[a]) the Supreme Court should have denied the motion”… . We note that, in light of the verdict in favor of the defendants, we do not otherwise review the propriety of the court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s in limine application. Farias-Alvarez v Interim Healthcare of Greater N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 08115, Second Dept 11-28-18

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY TO SCALDING A DISABLED CHILD BY BATHING HER IN WATER THAT WAS TOO HOT, AT THE SUBSEQUENT CIVIL TRIAL DEFENDANT WAS ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHILD SUFFERED AN ALLERGIC REACTION AND HAD NOT BEEN SCALDED, THE DEFENSE VERDICT WAS AFFIRMED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE REQUESTING THAT THE GUILTY PLEA BE GIVEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF THE ALLERGIC REACTION WAS ACTUALLY AN UNTIMELY SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, DESPITE SUPREME COURT’S GRANTING OF THE MOTION, THE DEFENSE VERDICT MAKES ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE ERROR UNNECESSARY  (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY TO SCALDING A DISABLED CHILD BY BATHING HER IN WATER THAT WAS TOO HOT, AT THE SUBSEQUENT CIVIL TRIAL DEFENDANT WAS ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHILD SUFFERED AN ALLERGIC REACTION AND HAD NOT BEEN SCALDED, THE DEFENSE VERDICT WAS AFFIRMED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE REQUESTING THAT THE GUILTY PLEA BE GIVEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF THE ALLERGIC REACTION WAS ACTUALLY AN UNTIMELY SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, DESPITE SUPREME COURT’S GRANTING OF THE MOTION, THE DEFENSE VERDICT MAKES ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE ERROR UNNECESSARY  (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY TO SCALDING A DISABLED CHILD BY BATHING HER IN WATER THAT WAS TOO HOT, AT THE SUBSEQUENT CIVIL TRIAL DEFENDANT WAS ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHILD SUFFERED AN ALLERGIC REACTION AND HAD NOT BEEN SCALDED, THE DEFENSE VERDICT WAS AFFIRMED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE REQUESTING THAT THE GUILTY PLEA BE GIVEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF THE ALLERGIC REACTION WAS ACTUALLY AN UNTIMELY SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, DESPITE SUPREME COURT’S GRANTING OF THE MOTION, THE DEFENSE VERDICT MAKES ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE ERROR UNNECESSARY  (SECOND DEPT))

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