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REVOCATION OF RACEHORSE TRAINER’S LICENSE BY THE NYS RACING AND WAGERING BOARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD WAS MET (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the revocation of petitioner’s racehorse trainer’s license by the NYS Racing and Wagering Board should have been confirmed. The Court of Appeals did not write a decision and adopted the reasoning of the dissenting justice on the Appellate Division:

From the Dissent in the Appellate Division’s Decision at 144 AD3d 1244, 1247-1252:

I agree with the majority that if the dates found on veterinary records … regarding specified forms of veterinary care represent the dates upon which such treatment was administered, those records, along with other evidence, chronicle 1,717 violations by petitioner of rules prohibiting the administration of specified substances to a horse within specified windows prior to a race. The majority, however, finds that a reasonable mind cannot reach the conclusion that those dates convey when treatment occurred. As a result, the majority annuls the entirety of respondent’s determination. In contrast, I find that the inference that respondent made that the dates listed next to specified veterinary care represent the dates that such care was administered to be reasonable and plausible. That conclusion requires confirmance and, accordingly, I respectfully dissent. * * *

Substantial evidence “demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable” … . Where “room for choice” exists in the inferences to be drawn from evidence, this Court has no power to preference its own interpretation over that of the administrative agency tasked with the determination … . This great deference accorded to such an agency determination derives from the Legislature’s decision to task an agency with expertise in the relevant law and regulations—rather than a court of general jurisdiction that lacks such expertise—with the authority to initially resolve legal disputes … . Matter of Pena v New York State Gaming Commn., 2018 NY Slip Op 08060, CtApp 11-27-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (REVOCATION OF RACEHORSE TRAINER’S LICENSE BY THE NYS RACING AND WAGERING BOARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD WAS MET (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, REVOCATION OF RACEHORSE TRAINER’S LICENSE BY THE NYS RACING AND WAGERING BOARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD WAS MET (CT APP))/NYS RACING AND WAGERING BOARD (REVOCATION OF RACEHORSE TRAINER’S LICENSE BY THE NYS RACING AND WAGERING BOARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD WAS MET (CT APP))

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