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ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the stipulation signed by plaintiff teacher, who agreed to resign in return for discontinuing the disciplinary hearing, was binding under contract principles, despite the inapplicability of CPLR 2104 to administrative proceedings. After signing the stipulation, plaintiff changed his mind:

In the stipulation, DOE (Department of Education] agreed to discontinue the disciplinary hearing on the pending misconduct charges and to take no further disciplinary action against plaintiff, in exchange for which plaintiff agreed “to irrevocably retire from his employment with [DOE] … .” The agreement was signed by plaintiff, his counsel, and DOE’s counsel … . Annexed to the stipulation was a letter signed by plaintiff and addressed to District Superintendent Karen Watts stating, “I hereby irrevocably retire from [DOE] … .” The stipulation contained a signature line for Superintendent Watts, who signed it several days later.

Before Superintendent Watts signed the stipulation, plaintiff notified DOE that he had changed his mind and wanted to rescind the stipulation. He argues that the stipulation was unenforceable when he changed his mind because not all the parties had signed it. …

Although CPLR 2104 is not applicable to agreements entered into in administrative proceedings, the stipulation signed by plaintiff and counsel acting on behalf of DOE is binding under general contract principles … . Plaintiff failed to show the existence of fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, or that counsel lacked DOE’s consent to enter into the stipulation … . Plaintiff’s agreement to retire was irrevocable, and plaintiff understood its consequences. His change of mind is not a cause sufficient to set aside his agreement … . Nor is his parol evidence, offered to show that the parties did not intend to be bound by the stipulation until Superintendent Watts had signed it, admissible to add to or vary the terms of the writing … . Matter of Nobile v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 08065, First Dept 11-27-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 2104  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))

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