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Expert Opinion About Link Between Trauma and a Stroke Erroneously Precluded/Frye Hearing Erroneously Ordered/The Opinion Evidence Was Not Controversial and Was Sufficiently Supported by the Relevant Literature to Obviate the Need for a Frye Hearing

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, with a concurring and a dissenting opinion, found that the trial court erred in precluding plaintiff’s experts from testifying about a causal link between an automobile accident and a subsequent embolic stroke.  The First Department further concluded that the opinion testimony about the causal link was supported by enough relevant literature to obviate the need for the Frye hearing which was (erroneously) ordered by the trial court.  The First Department went on to criticize the defense’s submission of motions in limine on the eve of trial, which, when erroneously granted, led to the plaintiff’s inability to make a prima facie case.  With respect to the criteria for a Frye hearing, the court wrote:

We reject the trial court’s determination that a Frye hearing was necessary. In the first place, defendants’ moving papers failed to justify the need for a Frye hearing at all. The affidavit by defendants’ expert in support of the motion merely asserted that the expert had “conducted a search of the relevant medical literature” and had found no support for plaintiff’s theory that the trauma from a motor vehicle collision caused the embolic stroke. Notably, defendants’ expert did not even point to literature or studies disproving such a link. Therefore, when, in response, plaintiff’s expert provided proof that literature supporting the theory existed and had been published in reputable professional journals and cited or discussed in others, the basis for defendants’ claim was negated; no factual issue was presented. At that point, it was up to the jury to decide whether to accept the assertion that the physical impact experienced by plaintiff in this accident was a competent producing cause of the embolic stroke.

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the opinion of plaintiff’s expert that the impact of the collision was a competent producing cause of the dislodgement of a clot, resulting in his stroke, is not the type of novel theory of causation that necessitates a Frye hearing; it was merely an opinion explaining the physiological process that caused the stroke plaintiff suffered.

Even assuming that the assertion by defendants’ expert warranted an evidentiary hearing to assess the reliability of plaintiff’s expert’s causation claims, the evidence presented at the Frye hearing sufficiently established the reliability of those claims.

Frye hearings are used “to determine whether the experts’ deductions are based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable” … . The test is particularly useful for newly minted or experimental processes or newly posited psychological theories, in order to weed out baseless and unreliable theories; a Frye hearing “should be held only if the basis for the expert’s conclusion is novel” … . “[W]here the proposed expert testimony concerns a claim that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the actions taken by the defendants, the whole concept of the Frye analysis is of limited applicability” ….

As the [2nd] Department observed in Zito v Zabarsky (28 AD3d 42, 44…), “general acceptance does not necessarily mean that a majority of the scientists involved subscribe to the conclusion. Rather it means that those espousing the theory or opinion have followed generally accepted scientific principles and methodology in evaluating clinical data to reach their conclusions.” There is no need here for the consensus the dissent claims is necessary. Sadek v Wesley, 2014 NY Slip Op 02551, 1st Dept 4-15-14

 

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