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DEALERSHIP HAD NOT TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR TO THE PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER, THE DRIVER STRUCK A BARRICADE WHICH IN TURN STRUCK PLAINTIFF WHO WAS WALKING ON THE SIDEWALK, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant car dealership (Port Motors) had not transferred ownership of the car to the purchaser (Love) at the time of the accident and was therefore liable to plaintiff as the owner of the vehicle. Plaintiff was injured when the driver (Lemos) struck a barricade which in turn struck plaintiff, who was walking on the sidewalk:

Because Port Motors “fail[ed] to comply with the statutory requirements regarding vehicle registration procedures . . . [it] is estopped from denying ownership of the vehicle and is fully liable to the plaintiff as if it were the owner’ of the vehicle” … . Although this Court has held that “title to a motor vehicle is transferred when the parties intend such transfer to occur” … , here, there is no evidence that the parties intended to transfer title to the vehicle from Port Motors to Love prior to the accident. …

The metal barricade standing in the roadway was not “a sudden and unexpected circumstance which le[ft] little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or cause[d] [Lemos] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he] [had to] make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct . . . “… . Rather, by colliding with the barricade and propelling it onto the sidewalk, where it struck a pedestrian, Lemos failed to both operate his vehicle in a manner that was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances  … and to see what was there to be seen through the ordinary use of his senses … . Bunn v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 07936, First Dept 11-20-18

NEGLIGENCE (VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, DEALERSHIP HAD NOT TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR TO THE PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER, THE DRIVER STRUCK A BARRICADE WHICH IN TURN STRUCK PLAINTIFF WHO WAS WALKING ON THE SIDEWALK, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (OWNER LIABILITY, DEALERSHIP HAD NOT TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR TO THE PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER, THE DRIVER STRUCK A BARRICADE WHICH IN TURN STRUCK PLAINTIFF WHO WAS WALKING ON THE SIDEWALK, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, DEALERSHIP HAD NOT TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR TO THE PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER, THE DRIVER STRUCK A BARRICADE WHICH IN TURN STRUCK PLAINTIFF WHO WAS WALKING ON THE SIDEWALK, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS  (VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, DEALERSHIP HAD NOT TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR TO THE PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER, THE DRIVER STRUCK A BARRICADE WHICH IN TURN STRUCK PLAINTIFF WHO WAS WALKING ON THE SIDEWALK, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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