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LAID OFF AT-WILL EMPLOYEE’S WHISTLEBLOWER (LABOR LAW 740) AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s whistleblower (Labor Law 740) and fraudulent inducement causes of action were properly dismissed. Plaintiff’s allegations did not meet the statutory criteria of Labor Law 740 and at-will employees who are laid off generally can not bring an action alleging fraudulent inducement:

[Labor Law 740] provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because such employee . . . discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation” that either “creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety, or . . . constitutes health care fraud” (Labor Law § 740[2][a]).

While the plaintiff in a whistleblower action must prove, at trial, that an actual violation of law, rule, or regulation occurred … , it is not necessary, for pleading purposes, that the plaintiff identify in the complaint the specific law, rule, or regulation that the defendant allegedly violated … .

Here, while the amended complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of law, rule, or regulation, it fails to allege any substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety resulting from such violation … . …

“New York law is clear that absent a constitutionally impermissible purpose, a statutory proscription, or an express limitation in the individual contract of employment, an employer’s right at any time to terminate an employment at will remains unimpaired,” and the Court of Appeals has “repeatedly refused to recognize exceptions to, or pathways around, these principles” … . Hence, as a general rule, at-will employees may not claim that they were induced to accept their position based on the belief that they would enjoy continued employment …, “even where the circumstances pertain to a plaintiff’s acceptance of an offer of a position rather than his or her termination” … . Since the plaintiff failed to allege any injury independent of termination of her employment, she cannot recover damages for what is, at most, an alleged breach of contract in the guise of a tort … . Coyle v College of Westchester, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07699, Second Dept 11-14-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (LAID OFF AT-WILL EMPLOYEE’S WHISTLEBLOWER (LABOR LAW 740) AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/WHISTLEBLOWERS  (LAID OFF AT-WILL EMPLOYEE’S WHISTLEBLOWER (LABOR LAW 740) AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/LABOR LAW 740 (WHISTLEBLOWERS, LAID OFF AT-WILL EMPLOYEE’S WHISTLEBLOWER (LABOR LAW 740) AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT (EMPLOYMENT LAW, AT-WILL EMPLOYEE, (LAID OFF AT-WILL EMPLOYEE’S WHISTLEBLOWER (LABOR LAW 740) AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/AT-WILL EMPLOYEES  (LAID OFF AT-WILL EMPLOYEE’S WHISTLEBLOWER (LABOR LAW 740) AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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