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DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION COULD NOT BE ENFORCED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the stipulation of settlement in this divorce action controlled, and a domestic relations order (DRO) which did not conform to the stipulation could not be enforced:

“A stipulation of settlement that has been incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract subject to principles of contract construction and interpretation” … . “A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert or, under the guise of construction, add or excise terms, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the apparent meaning” … . “A domestic relations order entered pursuant to a stipulation of settlement can convey only those rights to which the parties stipulated as a basis for the judgment'” … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the formula set forth in her proposed DRO conflicts with the stipulation of settlement, which provided for a “fifty/fifty division of all pension benefits accumulated from the date of this marriage … through the date of service of the summons and complaint … ,” and that the plaintiff is “to be the recipient of 50 percent of any and all benefits payable to the [defendant] upon his retirement which were accumulated during that period of time” … . The stipulation of settlement made no reference to the formula set forth in Majauskas v Majauskas (61 NY2d 481), nor can such a reference be implied from the unambiguous terms of the stipulation … . Since the stipulation is controlling, the Supreme Court should not have granted the plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to enter her proposed DRO … . McPhillips v McPhillips, 2018 NY Slip Op 06896, Second Dept 10-17-18

FAMILY LAW (DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION COULD NOT BE ENFORCED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION COULD NOT BE ENFORCED (SECOND DEPT))/DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER (DRO)  (DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION COULD NOT BE ENFORCED (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT (DIVORCE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION COULD NOT BE ENFORCED (SECOND DEPT))

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