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DEFENDANT OFFERED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OF THE REAR-END COLLISION, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should not have been granted. Defendant offered a nonnegligent explanation of the accident:

“It is well settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle . . . In order to rebut the presumption [of negligence], the driver of the rear vehicle must submit a non[]negligent explanation for the collision . . . One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision is a sudden stop of the lead vehicle . . . , and such an explanation is sufficient to overcome the inference of negligence and preclude an award of summary judgment” … . Here, defendant averred that he was traveling behind the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger when it stopped suddenly at a green light and that, despite his efforts, he could not stop in time to avoid a collision. Plaintiff offered a contrary account in her affidavit. Thus, there is an issue of fact sufficient to defeat plaintiffs' motion with respect to the issue of negligence … . Macri v Kotrys, 2018 NY Slip Op 06387, Fourth Dept 9-28-18

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT OFFERED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OF THE REAR-END COLLISION, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS  (DEFENDANT OFFERED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OF THE REAR-END COLLISION, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS  (DEFENDANT OFFERED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OF THE REAR-END COLLISION, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

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