You are here: / / REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED...

REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined that plaintiff's decedent was engaged in an “alteration” within the meaning of Labor Law 240 (1) when he was crushed by an air conditioning unit (a chiller) that was being hoisted. A hospital had rented the chiller as a supplement to the air conditioning system during the warmer months. The chiller was being readied for return to the lessor when the accident happened. The court found that air conditioning is essential to the functioning of the hospital, noting that operating rooms must be kept at 62 degrees:

Here, the work being performed was a significant change to the hospital's air conditioning system, which the hospital must operate in warm weather in order to meet its regulatory requirements. Like the application of “bomb blast” film to the lobby windows in Belding, the deinstallation and removal of the rented chiller “altered the configuration or composition of the structure by changing the way the [hospital buildings] react to . . . the elements” (Belding, 14 NY3d at 753). Moreover, like the dismantling and removal of the air handlers in [Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452 (2003)], disconnecting and removing the rented chiller and generator was a significant undertaking, was not simple, routine, or cosmetic, and fundamentally altered the function of a significant building system, the hospital's air conditioning system. As in Panek, the project took more than a day to complete. The qualifying work in both Belding and Panek appears to have been performed by one person. In contrast, here, the work was complex enough that it required the labor of employees of the hospital, the contractor and the multiple subcontractors. It required shutting off the valves on the hospital's chilled water supply and return in the mechanical room, unbolting and unscrewing approximately 125 feet of heavy, nonbending hose from the chilled water supply and riser; draining the water from the hoses and standby chiller; dismantling the scaffolding that served as a bridge carrying the hoses from the mechanical room over the sidewalk to the chiller; dismantling the fencing around the chiller and generator; closing the street outside the hospital; using lifting equipment to lower the hoses from the roof; and using a boom, chains, shackles, slings, and hooks to raise the trailer and chiller so that the decedent and his coworker could remove the wood blocks that leveled the trailer and chiller, in order to allow for the trailer to be removed. Under these circumstances, we find that the work decedent was engaged in constituted an alteration under Labor Law § 240. Mananghaya v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. 2018 NY Slip Op 06061. First Dept 9-13-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))/ALTERATION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))/AIR-CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
COMPENSATION FOR A GUARDIAN UNDER THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW IS NOT CALCULATED ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA IN THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT, GUARDIAN ENTITLED ONLY TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION.
THE JUDGE, PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL AGREED DEFENDANT SHOULD STEP OUT OF THE COURTROOM WHEN HIS JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS DISCUSSED IN A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S AGREEMENT TO HAVE DEFENDANT STEP OUT OF THE COURTROOM WAS NOT A WAIVER OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT; CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).
THE ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT INLCUDE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF A PATTERN OF DELAY; THEREFORE THE “FAILURE TO PROSECUTE” EXCEPTION IN CPLR 205 (A) DID NOT APPLY; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION BROUGHT WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).
PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT RENDERED THE ROBBERY INDICTMENT COUNT DUPLICITOUS BY SUGGESTING THE COUNT COULD APPLY TO THE THEFT OF A BICYCLE WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THAT COUNT (FIRST DEPT).
APPELLANT, WHO HAD PUT UP HER OWN MONEY FOR DEFENDANT’S BAIL, WAS ENTITLED TO REMISSION OF THE BAIL FORFEITED WHEN DEFENDANT MISSED HIS COURT DATE; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE AFFIDAVITS AND PSYCHIATRIST’S LETTER EXPLAINING THE MENTAL-HEALTH-RELATED REASONS FOR DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR (FIRST DEPT).
Prior Ruling on Appeal is Law of the Case for Both Trial and Appellate Courts
Clause in Appeal-Waiver Agreement Which Purported to Vacate Plea and Sentence Upon the Filing of a Notice of Appeal Unenforceable
ELEVATOR MAINTENANCE COMPANY DID NOT DISPLACE THE BUILDING OWNER’S AND MANAGER’S DUTY TO KEEP THE ELEVATORS SAFE AND DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM; IT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; A VIOLATION OF THE NYC BUILDING CODE IS NOT NEGLIGENCE PER SE (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL... PARTY OBJECTING TO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES’ NOMINATING PETITION DID NOT...