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REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined that plaintiff's decedent was engaged in an “alteration” within the meaning of Labor Law 240 (1) when he was crushed by an air conditioning unit (a chiller) that was being hoisted. A hospital had rented the chiller as a supplement to the air conditioning system during the warmer months. The chiller was being readied for return to the lessor when the accident happened. The court found that air conditioning is essential to the functioning of the hospital, noting that operating rooms must be kept at 62 degrees:

Here, the work being performed was a significant change to the hospital's air conditioning system, which the hospital must operate in warm weather in order to meet its regulatory requirements. Like the application of “bomb blast” film to the lobby windows in Belding, the deinstallation and removal of the rented chiller “altered the configuration or composition of the structure by changing the way the [hospital buildings] react to . . . the elements” (Belding, 14 NY3d at 753). Moreover, like the dismantling and removal of the air handlers in [Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452 (2003)], disconnecting and removing the rented chiller and generator was a significant undertaking, was not simple, routine, or cosmetic, and fundamentally altered the function of a significant building system, the hospital's air conditioning system. As in Panek, the project took more than a day to complete. The qualifying work in both Belding and Panek appears to have been performed by one person. In contrast, here, the work was complex enough that it required the labor of employees of the hospital, the contractor and the multiple subcontractors. It required shutting off the valves on the hospital's chilled water supply and return in the mechanical room, unbolting and unscrewing approximately 125 feet of heavy, nonbending hose from the chilled water supply and riser; draining the water from the hoses and standby chiller; dismantling the scaffolding that served as a bridge carrying the hoses from the mechanical room over the sidewalk to the chiller; dismantling the fencing around the chiller and generator; closing the street outside the hospital; using lifting equipment to lower the hoses from the roof; and using a boom, chains, shackles, slings, and hooks to raise the trailer and chiller so that the decedent and his coworker could remove the wood blocks that leveled the trailer and chiller, in order to allow for the trailer to be removed. Under these circumstances, we find that the work decedent was engaged in constituted an alteration under Labor Law § 240. Mananghaya v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. 2018 NY Slip Op 06061. First Dept 9-13-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))/ALTERATION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))/AIR-CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))

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