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INJURY FROM STEPPING INTO AN OPENING THAT IS NOT BIG ENOUGH FOR A PERSON TO FALL THROUGH IS NOT COVERED BY LABOR 240 (1) OR 241 (6) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action because injury caused by stepping in an opening that is not big enough for a person to fall through is not covered:

The defendants established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. The defendants submitted evidence that, although the plaintiff's foot slipped through openings in the rebar grid, the openings were too small for a person's body to fall through. The plaintiff testified at his deposition that his foot could fit through the openings, but not his entire body. The defendants, therefore, established that the openings of the grid did ” not present an elevation-related hazard to which the protective devices enumerated [in Labor Law § 240(1)] are designed to apply'” … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … .

The defendants also established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action, which was premised upon alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1) and (d), (e), and (f). The provision pertaining to “hazardous openings” (12 NYCRR 23-1.7[b][1]) does not apply to openings that are too small for a worker to completely fall through … . Johnson v Lend Lease Constr. LMB, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06004, Second Dept 9-12-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INJURY FROM STEPPING INTO AN OPENING THAT IS NOT BIG ENOUGH FOR A PERSON TO FALL THROUGH IS NOT COVERED BY LABOR 240 (1) OR 241 (6) (SECOND DEPT))

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