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DENIAL OF A LATE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO A JUROR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying a late peremptory challenge to a juror and ordered a new trial:

… [C]ounsel for codefendant Rodger Freeman stated, “There was one we missed, number eight.” The court responded, “We have eight.” In response, counsel for codefendant Rodger Freeman stated, “We don't want eight.” The court replied, “You already—you told me what the perempts are and who the selected jurors are,” and denied the request to challenge prospective juror eight. * * *

Under CPL 270.15, “the decision to entertain a belated peremptory challenge is left to the discretion of the trial court, in recognition that the voir dire process can often be time-consuming and requires practical limitations” … . Here, the delay in challenging prospective juror eight was de minimis. There was no discernable interference or undue delay caused by the defense's momentary oversight and the voir dire of the second subgroup of prospective jurors was still to be conducted. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court improperly denied the request to challenge prospective juror eight … . Since a trial court's improper denial of a peremptory challenge mandates reversal, we reverse the judgment and order a new trial … . People v Viera, 2018 NY Slip Op 06043, Second Dept 9-12-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF A LATE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO A JUROR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT))/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, DENIAL OF A LATE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO A JUROR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT))/PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE (JURORS, DENIAL OF A LATE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO A JUROR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT)

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