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HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined defendant church demonstrated it was entitled to the homeowner exemption from liability in this Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) actions stemming from plaintiff's fall from a scaffold. The failure to plead the exemption as a defense did not preclude raising it in the summary judgment motion. The Archdiocese was not an agent of the owner because it did not have the authority to control or supervise plaintiff's work.  And the Labor Law 200 cause of action should have been dismissed because the accident involved the means and methods of work controlled solely by plaintiff's employer:

Defendant Catholic Church of Christ the King made a prima facie showing that the accident in which plaintiff was injured falls within the exemption to Labor Law § 240(1) and Labor Law § 241(6) for “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” (Labor Law § 240[1]; Labor Law § 241). Plaintiff was repairing a detached garage associated with a church rectory used for both residential and church purposes … . Moreover, the certificate of occupancy indicates that the rectory constituted a dwelling and a private garage … . Defendant's failure to plead this affirmative defense in its answer does not mandate the denial of its motion, since plaintiff was not surprised by the defense, and fully opposed the motion (see CPLR 3018[b] … ).

Plaintiff failed to raise issues of fact as to the applicability of the homeowner exemption. His assertion that the garage was exclusively restricted to use by teachers at an elementary school owned by the church is unsupported by the record. Bautista v Archdiocese of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 05959, First Dept 8-30-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 3018 (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))/HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))

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