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HOMEOWNER’S DAUGHTER, AS EXECUTRIX OF DECEDENT HOMEOWNER’S ESTATE, ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), BUT DECEDENT’S SON, WHO GAVE WORK INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INJURED PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION AND MAY BE LIABLE AS AN AGENT OF THE OWNER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined one of decedent homeowner's children, Nina, who was the executrix of decedent's estate, was entitled to dismissal of the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action pursuant to the homeowner's exemption, but there was a question of fact whether decedent's son, Stephen, was liable as an agent of the owner. Plaintiff, who was hired to paint the interior of decedent's home, alleged Stephen instructed him to use a ladder to enter the house through a window. Plaintiff fell when the ladder slipped out from under him:

… [T]he defendants established the entitlement of Nina, as executrix of the decedent's estate, to the protection of the homeowner's exemption by submitting evidence that the decedent owned the one-family residence at which the work was being performed and that the decedent did not direct or control the work being done … . …

… Stephen did not own the subject residence and, therefore, was not entitled to the homeowner's exemption … . …

… [T]the defendants failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that liability for violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) could not be imposed upon Stephen as an agent of the owner. “A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured”… . “To impose . . . liability [under the Labor Law], the defendant must have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury so as to enable it to avoid or correct the unsafe condition” … . Here, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Stephen had the authority to supervise and control the plaintiff's work. Stephen told the plaintiff which rooms to paint and, according to the plaintiff, directed him to use a ladder to access the house through a window. Diaz v Trevisani, 2018 NY Slip Op 05823, Second Dept 8-22-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HOMEOWNER'S DAUGHTER, AS EXECUTRIX OF DECEDENT HOMEOWNER'S ESTATE, ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), BUT DECEDENT'S SON, WHO GAVE WORK INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INJURED PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION AND MAY BE LIABLE AS AN AGENT OF THE OWNER (SECOND DEPT))/HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER'S DAUGHTER, AS EXECUTRIX OF DECEDENT HOMEOWNER'S ESTATE, ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), BUT DECEDENT'S SON, WHO GAVE WORK INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INJURED PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION AND MAY BE LIABLE AS AN AGENT OF THE OWNER (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER'S DAUGHTER, AS EXECUTRIX OF DECEDENT HOMEOWNER'S ESTATE, ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), BUT DECEDENT'S SON, WHO GAVE WORK INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INJURED PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION AND MAY BE LIABLE AS AN AGENT OF THE OWNER (SECOND DEPT))/AGENCY (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER'S DAUGHTER, AS EXECUTRIX OF DECEDENT HOMEOWNER'S ESTATE, ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), BUT DECEDENT'S SON, WHO GAVE WORK INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INJURED PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION AND MAY BE LIABLE AS AN AGENT OF THE OWNER (SECOND DEPT))

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