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SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE STUDENT’S ACTIONS WERE IMPULSIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the school district's motion for summary judgment in this student on student assault case should have been granted. The student's pushing plaintiff's daughter was an impulsive act which could not have been anticipated or prevented by supervision:

… [T]he District established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging negligent supervision of the plaintiff's daughter by submitting evidence demonstrating that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous conduct that caused the injury, and that the other student's act of running up behind the daughter and pushing her as she was walking down the hallway at dismissal time was impulsive and could not have been anticipated … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The District also established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its employees … . Ramirez v Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 05788, Second Dept 8-15-18

NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE STUDENT'S ACTIONS WERE IMPULSIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE STUDENT'S ACTIONS WERE IMPULSIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT,  SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE STUDENT'S ACTIONS WERE IMPULSIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED (SECOND DEPT))/ASSAULT, LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE FOR (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW,  SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE STUDENT'S ACTIONS WERE IMPULSIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED (SECOND DEPT))

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