You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH PLAINTIFF...
,

PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED, PLAINTIFF’S RECOVERY RESTRICTED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff, who worked for Manpower Group and was injured on property owned by Crystal Springs, was not able to sue Crystal Springs. Plaintiff was deemed to be a special employee of Crystal Springs and his only remedy was Workers' Compensation:

Pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6), an employee who is entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits may not sue his or her employer based on injuries sustained by the employee. “For purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, a person may be deemed to have more than one employer—a general employer and a special employer”… . “The receipt of Workers' Compensation benefits from a general employer precludes an employee from commencing a negligence action against a special employer” … .

“A special employee is one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another'”… . ” [A] person's categorization as a special employee is usually a question of fact'” … “However, the determination of special employment status may be made as a matter of law where the particular, undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact'” … . ” Many factors are weighed in deciding whether a special employment relationship exists, and generally no single one is decisive. . . . Principal factors include who has the right to control the employee's work, who is responsible for the payment of wages and the furnishing of equipment, who has the right to discharge the employee, and whether the work being performed was in furtherance of the special employer's or the general employer's business. . . . The most significant factor is who controls and directs the manner, details, and ultimate result of the employee's work.'”  James v Crystal Springs Water, 2018 NY Slip Op 05756, Second Dept 8-15-18

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED, PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY RESTRICTED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (SPECIAL EMPLOYEE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED, PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY RESTRICTED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL EMPLOYEE (WORKERS' COMPENSATION, PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED, PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY RESTRICTED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION WAS PROVIDED BY THE ODOR AND OBSERVATION OF MARIJUANA; SEIZURE OF A TRANSPARENT BAG OF PILLS WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT THE PILLS WERE CONTRABAND AND THERE WAS NO MARIJUANA IN THE BAG (SECOND DEPT).
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF CPLR 3216; THEREFORE THE MATTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
ZONING BOARD DID NOT SET OUT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR FAILING TO FOLLOW ITS OWN PRECEDENT IN THIS VARIANCE PROCEEDING, ZONING BOARD’S GRANT OF THE VARIANCES WAS THEREFORE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REVIEWED THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE’S NONFINAL ORDER AND GRANTED FATHER’S OBJECTIONS, FATHER’S ARGUMENT THAT HE WOULD NEED TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND SPEND TIME AWAY FROM WORK TO LITIGATE THE MATTER DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF IRREPARABLE HARM NEEDED TO JUSTIFY A REVIEW OF A NONFINAL ORDER (SECOND DEPT).
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD.
USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT).
Current Builder Acquired a Vested Right to Variances Issued to Original Builder
THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY THE BANK TO PROVE (1) STANDING TO FORECLOSE THE REVERSE MORTGAGE, (2) DEFAULT AND (3) NOTICE WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE RELEVANT BUSINESS RECORDS, RENDERING THE AFFIDAVIT HEARSAY (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Petitioner Denied Right to Assistance of Counsel—Dismissal and Expungement... SNOW-REMOVAL EFFORTS NOT PARTICULARIZED, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR...