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MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY NAMING PLAINTIFF IN HER CAPACITY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER HUSBAND’S ESTATE, WHERE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint in this legal malpractice action to sue as a representative of the estate of her husband, rather than in her individual capacity, was properly granted:

“[A]n amendment which would shift a claim from a party without standing to another party who could have asserted that claim in the first instance is proper since such an amendment, by its nature, does not result in surprise or prejudice to the defendants who had prior knowledge of the claim and an opportunity to prepare a proper defense” … .

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to substitute herself in her representative capacity as the plaintiff in place of herself in her individual capacity. The proposed amendment, which only sought to shift the causes of action from the plaintiff in her individual capacity to herself in her representative capacity, was proper since the allegations set forth in the complaint gave the appellants notice of the legal malpractice causes of action being asserted against them in the amended complaint … . Moreover, the appellants' contention that they would be prejudiced by the amendment because the applicable statute of limitations had expired by the time the plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint is without merit, since the original complaint was timely filed and gave the appellants notice of the transactions and occurrences pleaded in the amended complaint (see CPLR 203[f] … ). D'Angelo v Kujawski, 2018 NY Slip Op 05750, Second Dept 8-15-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY NAMING PLAINTIFF IN HER CAPACITY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE, WHERE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 203  (MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY NAMING PLAINTIFF IN HER CAPACITY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE, WHERE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT BY NAMING PLAINTIFF IN HER CAPACITY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE, WHERE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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