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DIVORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SILENT ON THE DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE WAS INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 236 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, determined that a divorce settlement agreement which indicated a specific date (2020) when the husband’s maintenance obligation ends did not extend the husband’s maintenance obligation beyond the wife’s remarriage in 2015. Because the agreement was silent on the meaning of “maintenance” the court turned to Domestic Relations Law 236 which indicates that a maintenance obligation terminates upon remarriage:

A divorce settlement agreement is a contract, subject to standard principles of contract interpretation … . The agreement at issue does not explicitly define the term “maintenance,” and it is silent regarding the effect of the wife’s remarriage upon the husband’s maintenance obligation. Thus, the plain text of the agreement — which the Court of Appeals says is the best source of the parties’ intent … — is not conclusive of the question on appeal.

“Nevertheless, it is basic that, unless a contract provides otherwise, the law in force at the time the agreement is entered into becomes as much a part of the agreement as though it were expressed or referred to therein, for it is presumed that the parties had such law in contemplation when the contract was made and the contract will be construed in the light of such law” (Dolman v United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 2 NY2d 110, 116 [1956] …). The Dolman rule is of longstanding vintage, and the “principle embraces alike those [laws in force at the time of a contract’s execution] which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement” … . By virtue of the Dolman rule, when parties enter into an agreement authorized by or related to a particular statutory scheme, the courts will presume — absent something to the contrary — that the terms of the agreement are to be interpreted consistently with the corresponding statutory scheme … .

The statutory scheme corresponding to the agreement in this case is Domestic Relations Law § 236, which authorizes divorce settlement agreements and directs that such agreements specify the “amount and duration of maintenance,” if any … . The term ” maintenance’ ” is defined within this statutory scheme as “payments provided for in a valid agreement between the parties or awarded by the court . . . , to be paid at fixed intervals for a definite or indefinite period of time” … . Critically, the statutory definition includes the following caveat: any maintenance award “shall terminate upon the death of either party or upon the payee’s valid or invalid marriage” … . Burns v Burns, 2018 NY Slip Op 05411, Fourth Dept 7-25-18

FAMILY LAW (DIVORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SILENT ON THE DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE WAS INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 236 (FOURTH DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SILENT ON THE DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE WAS INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 236 (FOURTH DEPT))/MAINTENANCE (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SILENT ON THE DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE WAS INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 236 (FOURTH DEPT))

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