You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK OR IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA...

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK OR IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA WHEN HE WAS INJURED, HE WAS BRINGING IN SUPPLIES WHICH WERE BEING STOCKPILED AND WERE NOT FOR IMMEDIATE USE, THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the owner of the building (Sussex) and plaintiff’s employer (Berkoff) were entitled to summary judgment in this Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6) and 200 action. Plaintiff was injured when he fell bringing in boxes of tile and thin set using a hand truck. Plaintiff was not performing construction work within the mean of Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) because the material he was bringing in were not for immediate use. Both defendants established they did not supervise plaintiff’s work or have notice of any dangerous condition:

Sussex and Berkoff each established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against Sussex. The evidence supporting the motions established that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was not engaged in construction work within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), and was not working in a construction area within the meaning of Labor Law § 241(6), since the building materials were not being “readied for immediate use” … , but were instead being “stockpil[ed] for future use” … . …

Sussex and Berkoff each established, prima facie, both that Sussex did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the alleged condition which caused the plaintiff’s injury, and that it did not supervise or control the means and methods of the plaintiff’s work … . Kusayev v Sussex Apts. Assoc., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05458, Second Dept 7-25-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK OR IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA WHEN HE WAS INJURED, HE WAS BRINGING IN SUPPLIES WHICH WERE BEING STOCKPILED AND WERE NOT FOR IMMEDIATE USE, THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTRUCTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK OR IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA WHEN HE WAS INJURED, HE WAS BRINGING IN SUPPLIES WHICH WERE BEING STOCKPILED AND WERE NOT FOR IMMEDIATE USE, THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF PRIVITY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT ARCHITECT; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED A TURN IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE PER SE, CO-DEFENDANTS, WHOSE TRUCK COLLIDED WITH THE CAR DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHO VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, WHOSE ANSWER HAD BEEN STRUCK, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).
Plaintiff Entitled to Summary Judgment in Rear-End Collision Case—Plaintiff’s Statements in Hospital Record Not Admissible—No Relation to Diagnosis and Not Admissions
THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN REPAIR AS OPPOSED TO ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIR CONDITIONER WHEN HE WAS INJURED; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DIMSISS THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED; HOWEVER THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMIISED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO BOTH QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY.
COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS.
THE MEDICAL CENTER WAS ENTITLED TO THE NO-FAULT INSURANCE BENEFITS ASSIGNED TO IT BY THE PEDESTRIAN INJURED BY PLAINTIFF’S TAXI; THE FACT THAT THE PEDESTRIAN HAD SETTLED HIS ACTION AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF TAXI COMPANY DID NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE PLAINTIFF’S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO THE MEDICAL CENTER (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS... EIGHT YEAR OLD STUDENT MISSED HIS BUS AND WAS ALLEGEDLY TOLD BY A SCHOOL EMPLOYEE...