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TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner did not demonstrate the tenant, Cohen, violated a court order directing Cohen to pay his rent directly to the petitioner, who had a judgment against Cohen’s landlord. The court order required that Cohen pay any rent due under the lease to petitioner (CPLR 5225). However, the landlord terminated Cohen’s lease. Therefore Cohen did not not violate the order and should not have been held in civil contempt:

Here, the petitioner failed to establish that Cohen disobeyed the … order, which required him to “pay rent to petitioner as due under the lease” … . J…  Since Cohen’s lease … expired on July 31, 2015, on August 1, 2015, Cohen became a holdover tenant. Damages attributable to Cohen’s continued occupation of the premises were not due “under the lease,” but rather, were due as use and occupancy for the reasonable value of the premises … . “The obligation to pay for use and occupancy does not arise from an underlying contract between the landlord and the occupant” … . “Rather, an occupant’s duty to pay the landlord for its use and occupancy of the premises is predicated upon the theory of quantum meruit, and is imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice without reference to the intention of the parties” … . Accordingly, the motion to hold Cohen in contempt should have been denied. Matter of First Am. Tit. Ins. Co. v Cohen, 2018 NY Slip Op 05306, Second Dept 7-18-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, CONTEMPT, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5225 (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, CONTEMPT, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (CONTEMPT, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5225 (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, CONTEMPT, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (CONTEMPT, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5225 (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, CONTEMPT, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))/CONTEMPT (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE COURT ORDER DIRECTING HIM TO PAY RENT DUE UNDER THE LEASE TO THE LANDLORD’S CREDITOR, TENANT STOPPED PAYING THE RENT TO THE CREDITOR ONLY AFTER THE LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT))

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