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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRWAY WHICH COLLAPSED WAS TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, ONLY TEMPORARY STAIRWAYS ARE COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PROJECT MANAGER HAD SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined there was a question of fact whether the stairs which collapsed were temporary or permanent. If the stairs were temporary they would be considered the functional equivalent of a ladder and would be covered under Labor Law 240 (1). There was also a question of fact whether a project manager could be deemed a general contractor or agent of the owner with supervisory control and therefore potentially liable under Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6). There were also questions of fact whether the project manage was liable under Labor Law 200, depending on whether it had control over the work site or whether it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition:

“A temporary staircase that is used for access to and from the upper levels of a house under construction is the functional equivalent of a ladder’ and falls within the designation of other devices’ within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1)” … . … “[I]t has repeatedly been held that a stairway which is, or is intended to be, permanent—even one that has not yet been anchored or secured in its designated location . . . , or completely constructed . . . —cannot be considered the functional equivalent of a ladder or other device as contemplated by section 240 (1)” … . …

” An entity is a contractor within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) if it had the power to enforce safety standards and choose responsible subcontractors . . . , and an entity is a general contractor if, in addition thereto, it was responsible for coordinating and supervising the . . . project’ ” … . While a construction manager “is generally not considered a contractor’ or owner’ within the meaning of section 240 (1) or section 241” … , a construction manager may nevertheless be “vicariously liable as an agent of the property owner . . . where the manager had the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury” … . “The label given a defendant, whether construction manager’ or general contractor,’ is not determinative . . . [inasmuch as] the core inquiry is whether the defendant had the authority to supervise or control the activity bringing about the injury so as to enable it to avoid or correct the unsafe condition’ ” … . Stiegman v Barden & Robeson Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 04865, Fourth Dept 6-29-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRWAY WHICH COLLAPSED WAS TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, ONLY TEMPORARY STAIRWAYS ARE COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PROJECT MANAGER HAD SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 (FOURTH DEPT))/STAIRWAYS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRWAY WHICH COLLAPSED WAS TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, ONLY TEMPORARY STAIRWAYS ARE COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PROJECT MANAGER HAD SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 (FOURTH DEPT))/PROJECT MANAGER (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRWAY WHICH COLLAPSED WAS TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, ONLY TEMPORARY STAIRWAYS ARE COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PROJECT MANAGER HAD SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 (FOURTH DEPT))

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