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DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department dismissed the appeal of the defendant who had absconded during trial, was subsequently returned on a warrant 20 years later, and filed his brief 30 years after conviction:

The People seek to dismiss defendant’s appeal based on the “failure of timely prosecution or perfection thereof,” pursuant to CPL 470.60(1). Where a defendant’s appeal remained pending for a long time while he or she was a fugitive, whether the appeal should be permitted to proceed once the defendant is returned to custody is “subject to the broad discretion of the Appellate Division”… . In exercising its discretion, the Appellate Division may consider factors including whether defendant’s flight caused “a significant interference with the operation of [the] appellate process”; whether defendant’s absence “so delayed the administration of justice that the People would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at any retrial should the defendant be successful on appeal”; the length of the defendant’s absence; whether the defendant “voluntarily surrendered”; and the merits of the appeal …

Applying these standards, we exercise our discretion to dismiss the appeal. There was an extensive delay — more than 27 years — from June 12, 1987, when counsel, on defendant’s behalf, filed a notice of appeal, until September 2014, when defendant sought poor person relief and assignment of counsel, and defendant finally filed his appellate brief in June 2017, 30 years after his conviction. The delay was caused entirely by defendant’s own conduct in absconding from trial, and remaining a fugitive for close to 20 years. Defendant did not surrender voluntarily; rather, he was returned involuntarily on the warrant after being arrested and convicted under another name in Massachusetts. An important transcript and the court file, each of which has a bearing on issues defendant seeks to raise on appeal, have been lost, and it is unreasonable to expect a court to preserve such materials forever. The delay of over 30 years would severely prejudice the People if required to retry the case after appeal. Thus, these factors demonstrate that dismissal is appropriate … . We also note that this Court has fully complied with the requirement … that this determination be made after appellate counsel has been assigned and permitted to review the record. People v Perez, 2018 NY Slip Op 04669, First Dept 6-25-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT))/FUGITIVES (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT))

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