You are here: / / DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT...
,

DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department dismissed the appeal of the defendant who had absconded during trial, was subsequently returned on a warrant 20 years later, and filed his brief 30 years after conviction:

The People seek to dismiss defendant’s appeal based on the “failure of timely prosecution or perfection thereof,” pursuant to CPL 470.60(1). Where a defendant’s appeal remained pending for a long time while he or she was a fugitive, whether the appeal should be permitted to proceed once the defendant is returned to custody is “subject to the broad discretion of the Appellate Division”… . In exercising its discretion, the Appellate Division may consider factors including whether defendant’s flight caused “a significant interference with the operation of [the] appellate process”; whether defendant’s absence “so delayed the administration of justice that the People would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at any retrial should the defendant be successful on appeal”; the length of the defendant’s absence; whether the defendant “voluntarily surrendered”; and the merits of the appeal …

Applying these standards, we exercise our discretion to dismiss the appeal. There was an extensive delay — more than 27 years — from June 12, 1987, when counsel, on defendant’s behalf, filed a notice of appeal, until September 2014, when defendant sought poor person relief and assignment of counsel, and defendant finally filed his appellate brief in June 2017, 30 years after his conviction. The delay was caused entirely by defendant’s own conduct in absconding from trial, and remaining a fugitive for close to 20 years. Defendant did not surrender voluntarily; rather, he was returned involuntarily on the warrant after being arrested and convicted under another name in Massachusetts. An important transcript and the court file, each of which has a bearing on issues defendant seeks to raise on appeal, have been lost, and it is unreasonable to expect a court to preserve such materials forever. The delay of over 30 years would severely prejudice the People if required to retry the case after appeal. Thus, these factors demonstrate that dismissal is appropriate … . We also note that this Court has fully complied with the requirement … that this determination be made after appellate counsel has been assigned and permitted to review the record. People v Perez, 2018 NY Slip Op 04669, First Dept 6-25-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT))/FUGITIVES (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, DEFENDANT ABSCONDED DURING TRIAL, WAS INVOLUNTARILY RETURNED ON A WARRANT 20 YEARS LATER, AND FILED HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 30 YEARS AFTER CONVICTION, APPEAL DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER INJURY FROM A WOODEN CONCRETE FORM FALLING OVER WERE COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) (FIRST DEPT).
THE GUARANTEES QUALIFED AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY AND SUPPORTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT; ONLY PURELY LEGAL ARGUMENTS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL CAN BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).
LANDOWNERS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN PUBLIC VESTIBULE OF THEIR BUILDING WHERE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS SHOT (FIRST DEPT).
The Three-Year Statute of Limitations in the Education Law Need Not Be Raised as a Defense—Here the Charges Against a Teacher Were Time-Barred—The Department of Education (DOE) Did Not Demonstrate the Charges Were Criminal (to Which the Three-Year Statute Would Not Have Applied)
THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS WERE NOTIFIED THAT THE ELEVATOR DOORS CLOSED TOO FAST AND WHETHER REPAIRS TO THE DOOR COULD BE RELATED TO THE CLOSING VELOCITY; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HIS THUMB WAS CAUGHT IN THE CLOSING DOOR; DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
Criteria for Negligence on Part of Out-of-Possession Landlord with Limited Right of Reentry​
PROOF THE MORTGAGE WAS ASSIGNED TO PLAINTIFF WITHOUT PROOF THE NOTE WAS ALSO ASSIGNED BEFORE THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO FORECLOSE (FIRST DEPT).
HERE THE PLAINTIFF WAS IN PRIVITY WITH A NONPARTY WHICH WAS DEEMED TO HAVE HAD A “VICARIOUS DAY IN COURT” SUCH THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF’S ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTIONS TO DISMISS LEGAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ORIGINAL COUNSEL... NEW YORK’S TAX SCHEME DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE BY...