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PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a detailed, comprehensive two-justice dissent, determined that a purported oral agreement to sell works of art by Peter Beard was barred by the statute of frauds. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the causes of action for declaration, conversion and replevin was properly granted. Plaintiff Peter Beard was properly declared to be the sole owner of the art works. The dissent includes a detailed rendition of the facts which is not summarized here:

The motion court correctly found that the works of art at issue were goods, and thus that the purported oral agreement to sell them was barred by the statute of frauds (see UCC 2-201…). Defendants’ wire transfers to a third party, who then purportedly remitted the funds to plaintiffs, were not unequivocally referable to the agreement alleged, such as to deem the agreement partially completed and outside the statute of frauds … . Alternative explanations, including that the funds were for financing other projects involving the third party, defeat such claims … . Beard v Chase, 2018 NY Slip Op 04636, First Dept 6-21-18

​CONTRACT LAW (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT))/ORAL CONTRACTS (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (ORAL CONTRACT, PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT))/ART WORKS (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT))/UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT))/UCC  (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PURPORTED ORAL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ART WORKS BY PLAINTIFF PETER BEARD BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY REFERABLE TO THE ALLEGED CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT))

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