You are here: / / DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEED WAS...

DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED ON THE DATE OF THE DEED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FALL OCCURRED THE DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE DEED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that defendant did not rebut the presumption that the deed to the property where plaintiff fell was delivered and accepted the day before plaintiff’s fall:

… [D]efendant submitted, among other things, an executed copy of the referee’s deed transferring ownership of the subject property to defendant, dated March 28, 2013, one day before plaintiff’s alleged accident. Based on the foregoing, there is a strong presumption that the deed was delivered and accepted as of that date (see Real Property Law § 244…). The only additional documentation that defendant submitted to overcome the presumption was an affidavit from Anthony Iacchetta, an attorney who represented defendant’s predecessor in interest in its acquisition of the subject premises and a letter from Iacchetta’s firm dated April 11, 2013. In his affidavit, Iacchetta represents “that the transfer documents executed by the referee were not received by [his] firm until April 11, 2013,” and he provided a copy of the letter sent that same day forwarding said documentation to be countersigned. The documents submitted by defendant, however, do not address the parties’ intent or whether the deed was intended to be delivered and accepted as of April 11, 2013, as opposed to the deed’s March 28, 2013 execution date. Defendant, therefore, failed to rebut the presumption that the deed was delivered and accepted on March 28, 2013 … . Wisdom v Reoco, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 04628, Third Dept 6-21-18

​REAL PROPERTY (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED ON THE DATE OF THE DEED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FALL OCCURRED THE DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE DEED (THIRD DEPT))/DEEDS (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED ON THE DATE OF THE DEED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FALL OCCURRED THE DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE DEED (THIRD DEPT))/DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE (DEEDS, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED ON THE DATE OF THE DEED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FALL OCCURRED THE DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE DEED (THIRD DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY, DEEDS, (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED ON THE DATE OF THE DEED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FALL OCCURRED THE DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE DEED (THIRD DEPT))

You might also like
THE INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUDED COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY INTENDED OR EXPECTED BY THE INSURED; HERE THE INSURED UNINTENTIONALLY STRUCK COLE, WHO WAS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK UP A FIGHT BETWEEN THE INSURED AND A THIRD PERSON; BECAUSE THE INJURY TO COLE WAS UNINTENDED, THE INSURER WAS REQUIRED TO DEFEND THE INSURED IN COLE’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTION AGAINST THE INSURED (THIRD DEPT). ​
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HOTEL DEFENDANTS WERE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF A SNOWMOBILE TOUR GUIDE UNDER AN APPARENT AGENCY THEORY.
THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE RULE RE: MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS APPLIES TO MORE THAN JUST SURFACE DEFECTS; HERE THE RULE APPLIED TO AN ARCH-SHAPED BOLLARD OR BARRIER WHICH FELL OVER WHEN A CHILD WAS SWINGING FROM IT; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).
Arbitrator Exceeded Her Powers to Modify an Award and Failed to Make a “Final and Definite” Award
ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A DIRECT APPEAL, AND DESPITE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO RAISE THE WINNING ARGUMENT IN THE MOTION TO VACATE THE CONVICTION, THE THIRD DEPARTMENT GRANTED DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO REMOVE THE SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION FROM HIS SENTENCE; THE OFFENSE OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED IS NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE (THIRD DEPT). ​
THE FAMILY COURT JUDGE HAD REPRESENTED MOTHER IN A RELATED CUSTODY MATTER YEARS BEFORE FATHER BROUGHT A PETITION TO MODIFY CUSTODY; THE JUDGE WAS STATUTORILY DISQUALIFIED FROM THE CURRENT PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT). ​
Although Title Had Not Yet Formally Passed to the Driver/Owner, the Vehicle Was Covered as a “Newly Acquired” Vehicle Under the Terms of the Policy
JUSTICE CENTER DID NOT HAVE THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO MAKE A NEGLECT FINDING AGAINST A FACILITY FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAILURE TO PRESERVE VIDEO WHICH WOULD HAVE SHOWN THE CONDITION OF THE FLOOR... PRISON’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DIRECTIVE RE...