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COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a comprehensive and informative analysis, determined plaintiff had stated a negligence cause of against the town for the shooting death of plaintiff’s decedent, Nigro. The town police had responded to Nigro’s residence where she told the police her live-in companion, Groesbeck, had assaulted her. She also told the police Groesbeck, a former New Jersey police officer, had an unlicensed handgun. The police did not arrest Groesbeck, but took possession of the handgun. The police later returned the handgun to Groesbeck who subsequently shot and killed Nigro with it. The Second Department found that the complaint adequately alleged a special relationship between Nigro and the town, and further found that the town did not demonstrate the doctrine of governmental immunity applied as matter of law:

… [C]onstruing the complaint liberally and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, it was sufficient to allege the existence of a special relationship between the Town and Nigro. The complaint adequately alleged “direct contact” between the agents of the Town and Nigro … , and that the Town police department undertook “through promises or actions” an affirmative duty, on behalf of Nigro, to safeguard Groesbeck’s handgun … . In addition, the complaint adequately alleged circumstances indicating that the Town, through its agents, knew that the return of the handgun to Groesbeck “could lead to harm” … . The Town’s evidentiary submissions failed to “utterly refute” these factual allegations as a matter of law … .

… [T]he complaint was also sufficient to allege Nigro’s “justifiable reliance” on the Town’s affirmative undertaking to safeguard Groesbeck’s handgun … .  * * *

… [A] factfinder could reasonably conclude that Groesbeck’s use of the allegedly illegal handgun to harm Nigro was a “foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the [Town’s] negligence” … . * * *

The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to governmental immunity is distinct from the issue of whether a special duty exists in a particular case… . The doctrine of governmental immunity refers to “an affirmative defense on which [a defendant] bears the burden of proof” … . * * *

Even assuming that the allegedly negligent act of returning the handgun was discretionary in nature, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that “the discretion possessed by [the Town] was in fact exercised” … , or that any such exercise of discretion was “in compliance with the municipality’s procedures” … . Santaiti v Town of Ramapo, 2018 NY Slip Op 04584, Second Dept 6-20-18

​MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE,  COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE,  COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE,  COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))/POLICE (NEGLIGENCE, COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))/THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, LIABILITY FOR (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE,  COMPLAINT STATED A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT BY HER LIVE-IN COMPANION, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOWN AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT))

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