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You are here: Home1 / Administrative Law2 / NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO...
Administrative Law, Municipal Law

NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP)

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined that Nassau County did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it decided petitioner police officer was not entitled to indemnification for civil damages stemming from a law suit by an arrestee (Crews) who was allowed to remain incarcerated despite the police officer’s knowledge Crews could not have committed the offense:

General Municipal Law § 50-l, the statute at issue here, authorizes Nassau County to defend and indemnify police officers named as defendants in civil actions or proceedings, providing indemnification from “any judgment . . . for damages, including punitive or exemplary damages, arising out of a negligent act or other tort of such police officer committed while in the proper discharge of [the officer’s] duties and within the scope of [the officer’s] employment” … . The statute declares that “[s]uch proper discharge and scope shall be determined by a majority vote of a panel . . . appointed by” various Nassau County officials — respondent Indemnification Board. The legislature, thus, left the determination of whether the statutory prerequisites are met to the discretion of the Board.

In this case, we are essentially asked to determine the meaning of the word “proper” in the phrase: “proper discharge of [the officer’s] duties.” Petitioner argues that the phrases “proper discharge of [ ] duties” and “scope of [ ] employment” are interchangeable in this statute, requiring only that the officer be engaged in police work to be entitled to indemnification. However, such an interpretation reads the word “proper” out of the statute. The legislature’s inclusion of this modifier indicates an intent to hold officers to a higher standard than mere performance of duty. Read literally, the statute permits the Board to consider the propriety of the officer’s actions in determining whether defense and indemnification is appropriate, as it did here when it revisited its determination after learning petitioner concealed information that extended the pretrial detention of an innocent person. Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd., 2018 NY Slip Op 04382, CtApp 6-14-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE OFFICERS, NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, POLICE OFFICERS, NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP))/POLICE OFFICERS (MUNICIPAL LAW, INDEMNIFICATION, NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP))/INDEMNIFICATION (CIVIL DAMAGES, MUNICIPAL LAW, POLICE OFFICERS, NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP))/POLICE OFFICERS  (CIVIL DAMAGES, MUNICIPAL LAW, POLICE OFFICERS, NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP))

June 14, 2018
Tags: Court of Appeals
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-14 11:22:582020-01-24 11:16:12NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP)
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