You are here: / / MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED,...

MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s cross motion to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint was properly granted. Defendant doctor had retired and was no longer working at the place of business where the medical malpractice summons and complaint was served:

… [A]n attempt at service that later proves defective cannot be the basis for a “good cause” extension of time to serve process pursuant to CPLR 306-b… . However, the more flexible “interest of justice” standard accommodates late service that might be due to mistake, confusion, or oversight, so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant … . Indeed, the court may consider diligence or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor, in making its determination, including expiration of the statute of limitations, the potentially meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant … .

Here, several factors weighed in favor of granting the plaintiff’s cross motion. The action was timely commenced, and the statute of limitations with respect to one of the two causes of action had expired when the plaintiff cross-moved for relief  … . The appellant also had actual notice of this action within 120 days after its commencement … . Furthermore, an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint under CPLR 306-b in the interest of justice is available where, as here, “service is timely made within the 120-day period but is subsequently found to have been defective” … .Finally, we note that whether a plaintiff has demonstrated that he or she has a potentially meritorious cause of action is but one factor to be considered by a court in determining a CPLR 306-b motion … . Estate of Fernandez v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 2018 NY Slip Op 04306, Second Dept 6-13-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 306-b  (MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/SERVICE OF PROCESS  (MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/EXTEND TIME, MOTION TO (SERVICE OF PROCESS, MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PROPERLY GRANTED, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘GOOD CAUSE’ AND ‘INTEREST OF JUSTICE’ CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
MOTION TO RENEW PROPERLY USED TO CORRECT DEFECT IN INITIAL PAPERS (DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS UNSIGNED), PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT BAR SERVED DRIVER WHEN HE WAS VISIBLY INTOXICATED (DRAM SHOP ACT).
THE ARBITRATORS’ AWARD IN THIS RELIGIOUS DIVORCE PROCEEDING WAS NOT INVALID BECAUSE THE ARBRITRATORS DID NOT STATE THE REASONS FOR THE AWARD, AND THE AWARD WAS NOT INDEFINITE AND NONFINAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE VACATED THE AWARD (SECOND DEPT).
Proof Submitted in Reply Papers Not Considered
THE AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD AND JUDICIARY LAW CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED BY THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE; THE FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ALLEGE RELIANCE (SECOND DEPT).
AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
WHERE A MOTION TO RENEW IS NOT BASED UPON A CHANGE IN THE LAW, THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT FOR BRINGING THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT),
In a Case Consolidated with the Case Summarized Immediately Above, Defendant Was Entitled to Summary Judgment After Demonstrating None of the Three Theories of “Tort Liability Arising from Contract” Applied—Because the Facts Are Not Discussed, It Is Not Clear Why All Three Potential Theories Were Addressed in this Action But Only One Needed to Be Addressed in the Other (To Be Safe, Address All Three?)
THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN AT LIBERTY FOR 11 YEARS WITHOUT COMMITTING A SEX OFFENSE AND THE FOUR-YEAR DIFFERENCE IN AGE BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND THE VICTIM WARRANTED A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE TO LEVEL ONE (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

BUS DRIVER REACTED TO AN EMERGENCY, NOT LIABLE FOR SUDDENLY APPLYING THE BRAKES... PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DILIGENT EFFORTS TO SERVE DEFENDANT BEFORE USING...