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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact (1) whether one defendant, the general contractor Russco, could be liable under Labor Law 240 (1) for plaintiff’s fall from a ladder based upon contractual safety responsibilities, and (2) whether another defendant, Ruggles, could be liable under Labor Law 240 (1) as a statutory agent of the owner exercising supervision and control over the work:

… [T]he contract … provides that Russco [the general contractor] is responsible for “taking all reasonable safety precautions to prevent injury or death to persons or damage to property” and that such responsibility extends “to the protection of all employees on the Project and all other persons who may be affected by the Work in any way” … . The project is defined in the contract as “construction of all Tenant Improvements for a retail store.” Reading these contractual provisions together creates ambiguity as to whether Russco’s site safety obligations extended to the signage and awning work that plaintiff was performing when his accident occurred. * * *

The Labor Law § 240(1) claim should not be dismissed as against Ruggles. “Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners, general contractors, and their agents to provide proper protection to persons working upon elevated structures” … . “To be treated as a statutory agent, the subcontractor must have been delegated the supervision and control either over the specific work area involved or the work which [gave] rise to the injury'” … . “[O]nce a subcontractor qualifies as a statutory agent, it may not escape liability by the simple expedient of delegating that work to another entity”  … .

Ruggles is a proper Labor Law § 240(1) defendant because it was a statutory agent of Express, the owner of the project. White v 31-01 Steinway, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 04279. First Dept 6-12-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))

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