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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WHICH COULD STOP WORK FOR UNSAFE PRACTICES WAS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER OR CONSTRUCTION MANAGER FOR PURPOSES OF LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, affirmed the denial of summary judgment to plaintiff on his Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action. The court discussed the concept of a “statutory agent” of an owner or general contractor:

​Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) impose absolute liability on “contractors and owners and their agents” for worker injuries on construction sites… . CRSG, as site safety consultant, was neither an owner nor general contractor on the project. Thus, whether CRSG is subject to the Labor Law is dependent on whether it was an “agent” of the owners or [construction manager] at the site.

To hold a defendant liable under the Labor Law as a “statutory agent” of either the owner or the general contractor, it must be shown that the defendant had the ” authority to supervise and control'” the injury-producing work … . The determinative factor is whether the defendant had the right to exercise control over the work, not whether it actually exercised that right … . Where the owner or general contractor delegates to a third party the duty to conform to the requirements of the Labor Law, that third party becomes the statutory agent … .

The authority of DeSimone, as an employee of CRSG, to stop work in the event of unsafe practices raises an issue of fact as to whether CRSG is a “statutory agent” for purposes of the Labor Law … . Santos v Condo 124 LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 03799, First Dept 5-29-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WHICH COULD STOP WORK FOR UNSAFE PRACTICES WAS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER OR CONSTRUCTION MANAGER FOR PURPOSES OF LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WHICH COULD STOP WORK FOR UNSAFE PRACTICES WAS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER OR CONSTRUCTION MANAGER FOR PURPOSES OF LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT))

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