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CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD’S RECORDS CONCERNING A PARTICULAR POLICE OFFICER EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT)

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) records concerning a particular police officer were exempt from disclosure under the Public Officers Law and Civil Rights Law:

Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) provides, among other exceptions, that an agency may deny access to records that “are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.” One such statute is Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which, as relevant here, provides: “All personnel records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion, under the control of any police agency or department . . . shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review . . . except as may be mandated by lawful court order” (Civil Rights Law § 50-a[1]). As the Court of Appeals has acknowledged, the Legislature’s purpose in enacting Civil Rights Law § 50-a(1) was “to limit access to said personnel records by criminal defense counsel, who used the contents of the records, including unsubstantiated and irrelevant complaints against officers, to embarrass officers during cross-examination” … .

We agree with the Appellate Division, 1st Department, that records of the CCRB relating to complaints and proceedings against police officers are exempt from disclosure under Civil Rights Law § 50-a(1)… . The records that the petitioner requested are “personnel records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion.” Matter of Luongo v Records Access Officer, 2018 NY Slip Op 03681, Second Dept 5-23-18

​FREEDOM IN INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD’S RECORDS CONCERNING A PARTICULAR POLICE OFFICER EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER TH PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD’S RECORDS CONCERNING A PARTICULAR POLICE OFFICER EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER TH PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT))/CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD (POLICE OFFICER, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD’S RECORDS CONCERNING A PARTICULAR POLICE OFFICER EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER TH PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT))

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