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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant driver (Gould) who collided with another defendant driver (Pappas) who had failed to yield the right-of-way was not entitled to summary judgment, noting that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident:

There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident'” … , and “[g]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause” … .

While the driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield … , the driver with the right-of-way also has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles … .

The Gould defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cross claims asserted against them. While they submitted evidence that the Pappas vehicle failed to yield the right-of-way to their vehicle, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), the submissions in support of their motion failed to establish the Gould defendants’ freedom from fault and that the Pappas vehicle’s failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . Based on their submissions, which included the deposition transcripts of the respective parties, the Gould defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Gould took reasonable care to avoid the collision … . Miron v Pappas, 2018 NY Slip Op 03672, Second Dept 5-23-18

​NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/PROXIMATE CAUSE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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