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PARTIES’ CONDUCT AFTER THE PURPORTED TERMINATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT COULD INDICATE THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO CONTINUE (IMPLIED CONTRACT), DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the parties’ conduct after a purported termination of a shareholders’ agreement could indicate the parties intended the contract to continue (an implied contract). Defendant’s motion to dismiss this breach of contract action should not have been granted:

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we construe the pleadings liberally, accept the allegations in the complaint to be true, give [the] plaintiff[] the benefit of any favorable inferences and ‘determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'”… . Supreme Court held that defendant could not have breached the shareholders’ agreement in 2016, as the agreement explicitly terminated when he became the “only . . . remaining [s]hareholder” of the dealerships in 2007. It is true that “[w]hen a contract is terminated, such as by expiration of its own terms, the rights and obligations thereunder cease” … . Nevertheless, “the conduct of parties to a contract following its termination may demonstrate that they intended to create an implied contract to be governed by the terms of the expired contract, and whether there was a ‘meeting of the minds’ required for formation of such an enforceable agreement is generally a question of fact” … . It is undisputed that defendant continued to make monthly payments as required by the shareholders’ agreement after the shares were conveyed, and this ongoing compliance with the agreement’s terms required further inquiry into “the conduct of the parties to determine whether the terms of the [shareholders’ agreement] continue[d] to apply” … . Supreme Court accordingly erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant could not have breached the terms of the shareholders’ agreement due to its termination. Harris v Reagan, 2018 NY Slip Op 03408, Third Dept 5-10-18

​CONTRACT LAW (PARTIES’ CONDUCT AFTER THE PURPORTED TERMINATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT COULD INDICATE THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO CONTINUE (IMPLIED CONTRACT), DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS, PARTIES’ CONDUCT AFTER THE PURPORTED TERMINATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT COULD INDICATE THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO CONTINUE (IMPLIED CONTRACT), DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 3211(PARTIES’ CONDUCT AFTER THE PURPORTED TERMINATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT COULD INDICATE THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO CONTINUE (IMPLIED CONTRACT), DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))/IMPLIED CONTRACT (PARTIES’ CONDUCT AFTER THE PURPORTED TERMINATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT COULD INDICATE THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO CONTINUE (IMPLIED CONTRACT), DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))

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