You are here: / / SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM...

SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have placed defendant in a judicial diversion program in this cocaine-sale case. Defendant’s need for money to support his marijuana use qualified him for diversion, despite his prior completion of a drug treatment program:

The court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request to participate in the judicial diversion program. The court based this determination on the erroneous ground that defendant had failed to establish that his “substance abuse or dependence [wa]s a contributing factor to [his] criminal behavior” (CPL 216.05[3][b][iii]). “The statute does not require that a defendant’s . . . substance abuse or dependence be the exclusive or primary cause of the defendant’s criminal behavior,” but “only requires that it be a contributing factor” … . In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to selling cocaine to an undercover police officer for $300, and was found carrying that amount in prerecorded buy money, an additional $880 in cash, and three cell phones. Defendant reported that his heavy use of marijuana cost him about $50 to $60 per day. In light of these facts and other particular circumstances of this case, defendant’s need for enough money to fund that habit evidently contributed to his criminal behavior of selling cocaine.

Accordingly, the court should order judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216, giving due recognition to the drug treatment program defendant has already completed. This result is consistent with one of the purposes of judicial diversion, which is to permit a defendant to achieve a disposition other than a felony conviction, where appropriate. People v Alston, 2018 NY Slip Op 03324, First Dept 5-8-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DIVERSION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/JUDICIAL DIVERSION (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/DIVERSION (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/SENTENCING (JUDICIAL DIVERSION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
PLAINTIFF, ON A BICYCLE, WAS STRUCK BY A BUS AND SUFFERED TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY, A TORN ROTATOR CUFF AND SEVERAL HERNIATED DISCS; THE JURY’S DAMAGES AWARDS, WHICH INCLUDED $0 FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING AND PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES, WERE DEEMED UNREASONABLE; NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S OFFER TO PROVIDE FALSE TESTIMONY IN A SEPARATE ACTION IS NOT PROTECTED BY THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE IN THIS RELATED ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT’S BREACHED A CONFIDENTIALITY AND NONDISPARAGEMENT AGREEMENT (FIRST DEPT). ​
THERE CAN BE NO REPUDIATION WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A BREACH OF CONTRACT, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).
IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE SUPPORT POLE FOR THE SIDEWALK TENT FURNISHED THE OCCASION FOR THE SLIP AND FALL BY REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO CHOOSE WHICH SIDE OF THE POLE TO WALK ON BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT).
THE LOCAL LAW WHICH DISQUALIFIES CANDIDATES WHO HAVE CERTAIN FELONY CONVICTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED TO APPLY ONLY TO CONVICTIONS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE LOCAL LAW (FIRST DEPT).
THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
ACTION BASED UPON FAILURE TO SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S USE OF A HOSPITAL REST ROOM SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, THE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THAT NEW YORK’S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST PROPERTY OWNERS IN “MAJORITY-MINORITY” NEIGHBORHOODS; COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT CANADIAN INSURANCE COMPANY’S TIES TO NEW YORK WERE NOT SUFFICIENT... PLAINTIFF PHYSICIAN SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED HE WAS TERMINATED IN VIOLATION OF LABOR...