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LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for leave to appeal in a case seeking habeas corpus relief for two chimpanzees alleged to be confined by their owners to small cages in a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area … . Judge Fahey wrote a thoughtful concurring opinion questioning the rationale used by the Appellate Division to deny relief:

The Appellate Division’s conclusion that a chimpanzee cannot be considered a “person” and is not entitled to habeas relief is in fact based on nothing more than the premise that a chimpanzee is not a member of the human species … . …

The better approach in my view is to ask not whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether a chimpanzee has the same rights and duties as a human being, but instead whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. That question, one of precise moral and legal status, is the one that matters here. Moreover, the answer to that question will depend on our assessment of the intrinsic nature of chimpanzees as a species. …

Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced detentions visited on him or her? This is not merely a definitional question, but a deep dilemma of ethics and policy that demands our attention. To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect … . Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Lavery, 2018 NY Slip Op 03309, CtApp 5-8-18

​ANIMAL LAW (LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP))/APPEALS (ANIMAL RIGHTS, LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP))//HABEAS CORPUS (ANIMAL RIGHTS, LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR TWO CHIMPANZEES DENIED, THOUGHTFUL CONCURRING OPINION QUESTIONS THE ANALYSIS USED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND SUGGESTS RECOGNIZING THE CHIMPANZEES’ RIGHT TO LIBERTY (CT APP))

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