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EVIDENTIARY RULING BY A TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE AND WAS PROPERLY RECONSIDERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY A NEW TRIAL JUDGE, STATEMENT HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND OF A 911 CALL IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, NO EVIDENCE THE DECLARANT SAW THE SHOOTING (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a concurring opinion, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined that a statement heard in the background of a 911 call should not have been admitted as an excited utterance. The statement ostensibly identified the defendant as the man who had just shot three people. Other than the defendant’s fingerprint found on the van the shooter got into, there was no evidence identifying the defendant as the shooter. Two trial judges had ruled the 911 statement inadmissible before a third trial judge allowed it to come in. The Court of Appeals held that the law of the case doctrine did not prohibit the third judge from ruling on the admissibility of the statement, but the statement was inadmissible because there was no evidence the declarant observed the shooting:

The decision to admit hearsay as an excited utterance is an evidentiary decision, “left to the sound judgment of the trial court”… , and thus may be reconsidered on retrial … . There is no reason to apply a different rule to a successor judge within the same trial and we, therefore, have no basis to adopt a per se rule prohibiting a substitute judge from exercising independent discretion concerning an evidentiary trial ruling.  * **

A “spontaneous declaration or excited utterance — made contemporaneously or immediately after a startling event — which asserts the circumstances of that occasion as observed by the declarant” is an exception to the prohibition on hearsay … . “The admission of a hearsay statement under any exception deprives the defendant of the right to test the accuracy and trustworthiness of the statement by cross-examination”… . Although hearsay, excited utterances may be admissible because, “as the impulsive and unreflecting responses of the declarant to the injury or other startling event, they possess a high degree of trustworthiness, and, as thus expressing the real tenor of said declarant’s belief as to the facts just observed by him, may be received as testimony of those facts”… . … “[I]t must be inferable that the declarant had an opportunity to observe personally the event described in the [spontaneous] declaration” … . Direct observation by the person making the excited utterance ensures that the declarant is in fact reacting to and “assert[ing] the circumstances of” the event causing the excitement … . People v Cummings, 2018 NY Slip Op 03306, CtApp 5-8-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENTIARY RULING BY A TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE AND WAS PROPERLY RECONSIDERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY A NEW TRIAL JUDGE, STATEMENT HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND OF A 911 CALL IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, NO EVIDENCE THE DECLARANT SAW THE SHOOTING (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENTIARY RULING BY A TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE AND WAS PROPERLY RECONSIDERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY A NEW TRIAL JUDGE, STATEMENT HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND OF A 911 CALL IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, NO EVIDENCE THE DECLARANT SAW THE SHOOTING (CT APP))/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, EXCITED UTTERANCE, EVIDENTIARY RULING BY A TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE AND WAS PROPERLY RECONSIDERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY A NEW TRIAL JUDGE, STATEMENT HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND OF A 911 CALL IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, NO EVIDENCE THE DECLARANT SAW THE SHOOTING (CT APP))/EXCITED UTTERANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENTIARY RULING BY A TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE AND WAS PROPERLY RECONSIDERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY A NEW TRIAL JUDGE, STATEMENT HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND OF A 911 CALL IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, NO EVIDENCE THE DECLARANT SAW THE SHOOTING (CT APP))/LAW OF THE CASE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENTIARY RULING BY A TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE AND WAS PROPERLY RECONSIDERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY A NEW TRIAL JUDGE, STATEMENT HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND OF A 911 CALL IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, NO EVIDENCE THE DECLARANT SAW THE SHOOTING (CT APP))

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