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PERSON SENDING TEXT MESSAGES TO A DRIVER DOES NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO A PERSON INJURED BY THE DRIVER, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS DISTRACTED BY THE TEXTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, determined a person who sends text messages to someone who is driving does not owe a duty of care to a person injured by the driver, ostensibly because the driver was distracted by the texts:

… [I]t is the duty of the driver to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care in the operation of his or her vehicle to avoid a collision with another vehicle …  If a person were to be held liable for communicating a text message to another person whom he or she knows or reasonably should know is operating a vehicle, such a holding could logically be expanded to encompass all manner of heretofore innocuous activities. A billboard, a sign outside a church, or a child’s lemonade stand could all become a potential source of liability in a negligence action. Each of the foregoing examples is a communication directed specifically at passing motorists and intended to divert their attention from the highway.

To be sure, cellular telephones and other electronic devices present unique distractions to motorists. For that reason, the legislature passed laws specifically to regulate the use of cellular telephones and other electronic devices by those operating motor vehicles … . The legislature did not create a duty to refrain from communicating with persons known to be operating a vehicle. To the contrary, those laws place the responsibility of managing or avoiding the distractions caused by electronic devices squarely with the driver. The driver has various means available for managing or avoiding such distractions, such as a hands-free device to handle incoming calls…  or a setting for temporarily disabling sounds or alerts. Or, the driver can simply pull over to the side of the highway to engage in any communications deemed too urgent to wait. The remote sender of a text message is not in a good position to know how the driver will or should handle incoming text messages. Vega v Crane, 2018 NY Slip Op 03262, Fourth Dept 5-4-18

​NEGLIGENCE (TEXT MESSAGES, PERSON SENDING TEXT MESSAGES TO A DRIVER DOES NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO A PERSON INJURED BY THE DRIVER, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS DISTRACTED BY THE TEXTS (FOURTH DEPT))/DUTY OF CARE (TEXT MESSAGES, DRIVERS, PERSON SENDING TEXT MESSAGES TO A DRIVER DOES NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO A PERSON INJURED BY THE DRIVER, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS DISTRACTED BY THE TEXTS (FOURTH DEPT))/TEXT MESSAGES (NEGLIGENCE, DRIVERS, PERSON SENDING TEXT MESSAGES TO A DRIVER DOES NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO A PERSON INJURED BY THE DRIVER, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS DISTRACTED BY THE TEXTS (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (TEXT MESSAGES, DRIVERS, PERSON SENDING TEXT MESSAGES TO A DRIVER DOES NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO A PERSON INJURED BY THE DRIVER, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS DISTRACTED BY THE TEXTS (FOURTH DEPT))/DRIVERS (TEXT MESSAGES, NEGLIGENCE, PERSON SENDING TEXT MESSAGES TO A DRIVER DOES NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO A PERSON INJURED BY THE DRIVER, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS DISTRACTED BY THE TEXTS (FOURTH DEPT))

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