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MERE USE OF ANOTHER’S PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION, LIKE A CREDIT CARD NUMBER, ESTABLISHES A VIOLATION OF NEW YORK’S IDENTITY THEFT STATUTE, THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT ASSUMED THE VICTIM’S IDENTITY IN SOME ADDITIONAL WAY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissent, determined that New York’s identity theft statute is violated by the use of personal identifying information, like a credit card number, without more. The 1st Department case, which was reversed, had held the mere use of personal identifying information is insufficient, and the People must establish a defendant both used the victim’s personal identifying information and assumed the victim’s identity. The 1st Department concluded the proof had established that defendant used the personal identifying information of the victim but not that he assumed her identity. (The defendant in the 1st Department case had assumed the identity of a fictitious person.) The 4th Department case, which was affirmed, concluded defendant’s use of the victim’s name and bank account number established she assumed his identity within the meaning of the statute, and the phrase “assumes the identity of another person” is not a discrete element of the identity theft statute:

The common issue presented in these appeals is whether the People may establish that a defendant “assumes the identity of another,” within the meaning of New York’s identity theft statute, by proof that the defendant used another’s personal identifying information, such as that person’s name, bank account, or credit card number. Defendants … argue that the use of personal identifying information does not automatically establish that a defendant assumes another’s identity, and thus the People bear the burden of establishing independently both a defendant’s use of protected information and assumptive conduct. The Appellate Division departments have split on the proper interpretation of the disputed statutory text. The 1st Department adopted the construction advanced here by defendants, leading to its conclusion that [the] conviction of identity theft was unsupported by sufficient evidence. By contrast, the 4th Department concluded that the statute applies when a defendant uses the personal identifying information of another, upholding [the] conviction. We now reject defendants’ decontextualized interpretation of the statutory language and conclude that the law defines the use of personal identifying information of another as one of the express means by which a defendant assumes that person’s identity. People v Roberts, 2018 NY Slip Op 03172, CtApp 5-3-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (IDENTITY THEFT, MERE USE OF ANOTHER’S PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION, LIKE A CREDIT CARD NUMBER, ESTABLISHES A VIOLATION OF NEW YORK’S IDENTITY THEFT STATUTE, THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT ASSUMED THE VICTIM’S IDENTITY IN SOME ADDITIONAL WAY (CT APP))/IDENTITY THEFT (MERE USE OF ANOTHER’S PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION, LIKE A CREDIT CARD NUMBER, ESTABLISHES A VIOLATION OF NEW YORK’S IDENTITY THEFT STATUTE, THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT ASSUMED THE VICTIM’S IDENTITY IN SOME ADDITIONAL WAY (CT APP))

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