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PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S FEE WAS UNCONSCIONABLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined the cause action alleging defendant attorney’s fee was unconscionable should not have been dismissed. The court further determined that plaintiff’s motion to disqualify defendant’s attorney because plaintiff had initially consulted with an attorney at the defendant’s attorney’s firm was properly denied:

Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and the averments in the affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion, we conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the elements of procedural and substantive unconscionability. As for procedural unconscionability, plaintiff alleged that, before entering into the agreement, he was not informed of the nature of the anticipated charges or the prospects of incarceration, and he was led to believe that defendant would be able to resolve the case without a prison sentence. At the time he entered into the agreement, plaintiff was in the hospital, and defendant was, or was perceived to be, an experienced attorney with unparalleled expertise in defending against cases involving driving while intoxicated. As for substantive unconscionability, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s $125,000 fee was at least three times larger than, and thus drastically out of proportion with, fees charged in similar cases. We further conclude that defendant’s evidentiary submissions in support of the motion, which included his own affidavit and that of an expert, did not conclusively establish that the agreement was ” fair, reasonable, and fully known and understood’ ” by plaintiff … . …

[The submitted] affidavits establish that the attorney with whom plaintiff consulted had no recollection and kept no notes of the consultation, did not share with defendant’s attorney any information that he learned during the consultation, and would not discuss the present action with defendant’s attorney in the future. Furthermore, the affidavits establish that the law firm employs screening procedures consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct and that defendant’s attorney would not be sharing any fees with the attorney with whom plaintiff consulted. Thus, the affidavits establish compliance with rule 1.18 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0), and we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion … . Divito v Fiandach, 2018 NY Slip Op 02922, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

ATTORNEYS (PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S FEE WAS UNCONSCIONABLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEY’S FEES (UNCONSCIONABLE, PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S FEE WAS UNCONSCIONABLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/UNCONSCIONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES  (PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S FEE WAS UNCONSCIONABLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEYS (MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/CONFLICT OF INTEREST (ATTORNEYS, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ATTORNEYS, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD INITIALLY CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY AT THE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S FIRM PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))

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