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ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO GUARD RAILS ON THE SCAFFOLD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIE OFF HIS HARNESS AND LANYARD, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FROM A FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff’s conduct (not tying off a safety harness) was the sole proximate cause of his injuries from a fall. Therefore his motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly denied:

Defendants had engaged claimant’s employer to sandblast and repaint the overpass. In order to perform the work, a truck known as a V-Deck was parked underneath the overpass. The truck had wings that fold out to provide a platform for the blasters, and aluminum scaffolding was erected on the wings of the truck. The scaffolding had no guardrail. Claimant was, however, provided with safety equipment, including a safety harness with a six-foot lanyard. While blasting one evening, plaintiff fell 15 feet to the pavement. His safety harness was not tied off. …

… [C]laimant acknowledged that he had a safety harness with a six-foot lanyard, that he had previously used it on the same job, and that he “probably” could have tied it off to the cross-bracing prior to his fall. Indeed, claimant correctly concedes on this appeal that there is an issue of fact whether adequate tie-off points were available. Furthermore, claimant testified that, if he had tied his six-foot lanyard off to the cross-bracing, he “wouldn’t have fallen” 15 feet to the pavement. Weitzel v State of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 02946, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO GUARD RAILS ON THE SCAFFOLD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIE OFF HIS HARNESS AND LANYARD, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FROM A FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO GUARD RAILS ON THE SCAFFOLD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIE OFF HIS HARNESS AND LANYARD, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FROM A FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO GUARD RAILS ON THE SCAFFOLD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIE OFF HIS HARNESS AND LANYARD, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FROM A FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT))

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