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MORTGAGE WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT DESCRIBED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY A SINGLE LOT NUMBER AND BY METES AND BOUNDS WHICH ENCOMPASSED TWO LOTS, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact about the intent of the parties with respect to the property to which the plaintiff’s mortgage applied. The mortgage indicated the subject property by lot number and by metes and bounds. The metes and bounds description encompassed two lots:

Real Property Law § 240(3) provides that an instrument “creating, transferring, assigning or surrendering an estate or interest in real property” must be construed “according to the intent of the parties, so far as such intent can be gathered from the whole instrument, and is consistent with the rules of law.” “Where the language used in [a mortgage] is ambiguous such that it is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the courts will look beyond the written instrument to the surrounding circumstances”… .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, there is no rule that it is the metes and bounds description that determines what property is encumbered by any mortgage and not the street address or tax lot numbers. Rather, where, as here, there is a conflict between the metes and bounds description and the street address and/or tax lot numbers given in the mortgage, there is an ambiguity that requires consideration of parol evidence … Here, the … mortgage was “ambiguous on its face,” because “it refer[red] to one lot, but contain[ed] a metes and bounds description” for two lots … . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Zhan Hua Cao, 2018 NY Slip Op 02603, Second Dept 4-18-18

​FORECLOSURE (MORTGAGE WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT DESCRIBED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY A SINGLE LOT NUMBER AND BY METES AND BOUNDS WHICH ENCOMPASSED TWO LOTS, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/MORTGAGES (MORTGAGE WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT DESCRIBED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY A SINGLE LOT NUMBER AND BY METES AND BOUNDS WHICH ENCOMPASSED TWO LOTS, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY LAW (MORTGAGE WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT DESCRIBED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY A SINGLE LOT NUMBER AND BY METES AND BOUNDS WHICH ENCOMPASSED TWO LOTS, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/METES AND BOUNDS  (MORTGAGE WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT DESCRIBED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY A SINGLE LOT NUMBER AND BY METES AND BOUNDS WHICH ENCOMPASSED TWO LOTS, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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