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PROPERTY OWNER’S LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD THAT DID NOT HAVE SAFETY RAILINGS IS BASED UPON ITS STATUS AS AN OWNER, NOT NEGLIGENCE, THEREFORE PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM GENERAL CONTRACTOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, who fell from a scaffold that did not have a safety railing,  was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. The property owner was entitled to summary judgment against the general contractor on its indemnification action because the property owner was not negligent:

Labor Law § 240(1) requires property owners and contractors to furnish, or cause to be furnished, safety devices, such as scaffolds, which are “so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” to workers. “To establish liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of the statute and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries”… . Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that he was injured when he fell from a scaffold that lacked safety rails on the sides, and that he was not provided with a safety device to prevent him from falling … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Additionally, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s (property owner’s) motion for summary judgment on the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification against the general contractor. The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting a copy of a “Release and Hold Harmless Agreement,” together with evidence showing that it was free from any negligence in connection with the accident … . … Here, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff under Labor Law § 240(1) based solely upon its status as the owner of the premises. There is no evidence that the defendant was negligent, or that it directed, controlled, or supervised the manner in which the plaintiff performed his work… . Marulanda v Vance Assoc., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02452, Second Dept 4-11-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PROPERTY OWNER’S LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD THAT DID NOT HAVE SAFETY RAILINGS IS BASED UPON ITS STATUS AS AN OWNER, NOT NEGLIGENCE, THEREFORE PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM GENERAL CONTRACTOR (SECOND DEPT))/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PROPERTY OWNER’S LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD THAT DID NOT HAVE SAFETY RAILINGS IS BASED UPON ITS STATUS AS AN OWNER, NOT NEGLIGENCE, THEREFORE PROPERTY OWNER ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM GENERAL CONTRACTOR (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF’S FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, SUA SPONTE, AS ABANDONED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48; THE 60-DAY TIME LIMIT ONLY APPLIES TO THE DIRECTION TO SUBMIT A JUDGMENT “ON NOTICE” (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE ACCEPTED DEFECTIVE GOODS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UCC, THE UCC PROVIDES REMEDIES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BE MADE WHOLE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE ACCEPTANCE; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). ​
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