You are here: / / MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION...

MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have vacated a stipulated entered into in open court and signed by an attorney who had represented the plaintiff and had the apparent authority to enter the stipulation. The motion to vacate was made by new counsel hired by plaintiff:

The stipulation, signed by counsel for each party in this action during a court appearance, is a binding contract (see CPLR 2104 … ). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, her counsel at the time of the stipulation had the apparent authority to enter into the stipulation. This prior counsel signed and verified the summons and complaint, appeared for the plaintiff at the preliminary conference and the compliance conference, and filed a note of issue, all before entering into the stipulation on the plaintiff’s behalf. The presence of an attorney at pretrial conferences constitutes “an implied representation by [the client] to defendants that [the attorney] had authority” to bind the client to a stipulation … . Indeed, only attorneys who are authorized to enter into binding stipulations may appear at pretrial conferences … . Here, the plaintiff’s engagement of her prior counsel to represent her throughout the litigation and to appear on her behalf at pretrial and compliance conferences precludes her from arguing that prior counsel lacked the authority to bind her to the stipulation. “A stipulation made by the attorney may bind a client even where it exceeds the attorney’s actual authority if the attorney had apparent authority to enter into the stipulation … . Chae Shin Oh v Jeannot, 2018 NY Slip Op 02446, Second Dept 4-11-18

​ATTORNEYS (STIPULATIONS, MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (STIPULATIONS, MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (ATTORNEYS, MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT))/APPARENT AUTHORITY (ATTORNEYS, STIPULATIONS, MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT, IN A WRITING SIGNED IN OPEN COURT, TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF AN ALTERNATE JUROR AFTER DELIBERATIONS HAD BEGUN REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL; THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS UNREASONABLE AND UNDULY SUGGESTIVE REQUIRING DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTS RELATED TO ONE OF THE TWO ROBBERIES (SECOND DEPT). ​
DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT UNDER DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.
APPELLANT WAS SLOWING DOWN APPROACHING PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WHICH WAS STOPPED WHEN APPELLANT WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND AND PUSHED INTO PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE; APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).
BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THE PLEAS AND SENTENCING COMMITMENTS, THE SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BASED ON THE PURPORTED VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT SENTENCING, ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPELLATE COURT CONSIDERED IT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT STATE IT WAS BASED ON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE AND THE UNCERTIFIED POLICE REPORT WAS INADMISSIBLE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PROPERTY-DAMAGE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT BAR NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES AND DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT RESULTING FROM AN ALTERCATION ON A PUBLIC ROAD IN FRONT OF THE BAR, BAR EXERCISED NO CONTROL OVER THE AREA WHERE THE ALTERCATION OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT).
THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND WILL BE HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SHOW THE EQUIVALENCY OF THE CALIFORNIA ROBBERY CONVICTION, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FIREFIGHTER’S DEATH DURING A TRAINING EXERCISE NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER GENERAL... THE EXPENSE OF DEFENDING AN ACTION WHICH STEMMED FROM AN ATTORNEY’S MISREPRESENTATION...