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USE OF A MAKESHIFT LADDER WHEN AN A-FRAME WAS AVAILABLE OR DESCENDING THE LADDER BACKWARDS WITH SHOES UNTIED DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly granted. Use of a makeshift ladder when an A-frame ladder was available, the fact that plaintiff descended the ladder backwards, and the fact that plaintiff’s boots may have been untied did not constitute the sole proximate cause of the accident:

Plaintiff electrician was injured when he fell from a makeshift wooden ladder while negotiating the distance between the first-floor slab of the building under construction and the ground about five feet below, as he was helping unload a delivery of supplies that was being unloaded from the truck on ground level and placed on the slab. Although plaintiff had been provided an A-frame ladder that morning which was in the basement of the building, the parties cite no evidence contradicting plaintiff’s testimony that he could not use it to access the slab because the ground was covered in dirt, debris, and rocks.

Plaintiff’s decision to use the makeshift ladder that his coworkers were also allegedly using was not the sole proximate cause of the accident where he was never instructed not to use it … . Moreover, where no proper safety device was provided, the fact that his boots may have been untied or that he may have been descending the makeshift ladder backwards was not the sole proximate cause of his accident … . Jarzabek v Schafer Mews Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02295, First Dept 4-3-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (USE OF A MAKESHIFT LADDER WHEN AN A-FRAME WAS AVAILABLE OR DESCENDING THE LADDER BACKWARDS WITH SHOES UNTIED DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, USE OF A MAKESHIFT LADDER WHEN AN A-FRAME WAS AVAILABLE OR DESCENDING THE LADDER BACKWARDS WITH SHOES UNTIED DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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