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THE TERMS ‘EVENT OF DEFAULT’ AND ‘DEFAULT’ WHICH APPEARED IN TWO DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE DEEMED TO MEAN THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THE TERMS WERE DEEMED SYNONYMOUS PLAINTIFF DID NOT MEET ALL THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR STANDING TO SUE, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the derivative action for breach of an Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) was properly dismissed because plaintiffs did not fulfill all of the conditions precedent for bringing the suit, which alleged the defendants’ failure to determine the fair value of a loan. Whether the contractual conditions precedent were met turned on whether the term “event of default” in one provision was synonymous with the term “default” in another provision. Because the two terms were deemed to mean the same thing, a condition precedent for the suit was not met:

Because the uncontroverted and unambiguous documentary evidence demonstrates that plaintiff failed to satisfy the terms of section 7.01(a)(iii) defining the Event of Default here at issue, plaintiff’s compliance with the conditions precedent of section 12.03(c) does not suffice to afford it standing to sue, as it has failed to demonstrate an actionable Event of Default under the PSA. Thus, KeyBank and Berkadia have conclusively established a defense to plaintiff’s asserted claims as a matter of law … and the motion court correctly granted both defendants’ CPLR 3211(a)(1) motions to dismiss. Alden Global Value Recovery Master Fund, L.P. v KeyBank N.A., 2018 NY Slip Op 02241, First Dept 3-29-18

CONTRACT LAW (THE TERMS ‘EVENT OF DEFAULT’ AND ‘DEFAULT’ WHICH APPEARED IN TWO DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE DEEMED TO MEAN THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THE TERMS WERE DEEMED SYNONYMOUS PLAINTIFF DID NOT MEET ALL THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR STANDING TO SUE, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/DEFAULT (CONTRACT LAW, THE TERMS ‘EVENT OF DEFAULT’ AND ‘DEFAULT’ WHICH APPEARED IN TWO DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE DEEMED TO MEAN THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THE TERMS WERE DEEMED SYNONYMOUS PLAINTIFF DID NOT MEET ALL THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR STANDING TO SUE, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/EVENT OF DEFAULT (CONTRACT LAW, THE TERMS ‘EVENT OF DEFAULT’ AND ‘DEFAULT’ WHICH APPEARED IN TWO DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE DEEMED TO MEAN THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THE TERMS WERE DEEMED SYNONYMOUS PLAINTIFF DID NOT MEET ALL THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR STANDING TO SUE, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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