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APPLYING THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENTIARY STANDARD, THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES’ (DMV’S) SUSPENSION OF PETITIONER BUS DRIVER’S LICENSE BASED UPON STRIKING A PEDESTRIAN WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF THE EXTENT OF THE INJURY OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INJURY AND THE PEDESTRIAN’S DEATH A MONTH LATER, DETERMINATION ANNULLED AND LICENSE REINSTATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, annulling the determination of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined the record did not support the suspension of petitioner-bus-driver’s license for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1146. The court noted that the standard of proof in the DMV hearing is “clear and convincing” and the standard of proof in the instant Article 78 proceeding is “substantial evidence.” Effectively, therefore, the “clear and convincing” standard applies to the Article 78. Here, on a dark and rainy night, an 88-year-old pedestrian apparently came into contact with the bus in the crosswalk when the bus was turning. The man died a month later. In the opinion of the majority, the hearing evidence did not demonstrate how seriously the man was injured by the bus, or a connection between any injury and the man’s death a month later:

Here, DMV was required to establish that petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(c)(1), which imposes liability on “[a] driver of a motor vehicle who causes serious physical injury as defined in article ten of the penal law to a pedestrian or bicyclist while failing to exercise due care.” The referenced definition of “serious physical injury” includes “physical injury . . . which causes death,” … which is presumably the basis for the charge against petitioner since he was not issued a summons until after the pedestrian died in the hospital. Thus, DMV was required to present clear and convincing evidence of both failure to exercise care and that such failure led to the pedestrian’s demise. * * *

To be sure, one could speculate, as does the dissent, that the pedestrian suffered a “serious physical injury.” But to engage in speculation would be to ignore the underlying standard of clear and convincing evidence, which even the dissent agrees applied in the administrative proceeding and is relevant to our review. “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that satisfies the factfinder that it is highly probable that what is claimed actually happened . . . and it is evidence that is neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions”… . Given that standard, and the remarkable lack of compelling evidence before us, we would be abdicating our role were we simply to defer to the conclusions drawn by the Administrative Law Judge, and raising a serious question as to the very purpose of having any appellate review in this matter. Matter of Seon v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 2018 NY Slip Op 02240, First Dept 3-29-18

 

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